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Slizeski et al.: Labor Law

LABOR LAW
I. CALIFORNIA STATE COUNCIL v. ASSOCIATED GENERAL CONTRACTORS OF CALIFORNIA: NO LABOR
MARKET PER SE EXEMPTION FROM THE ANTITRUST LAWS FOR EMPLOYERS

A.

INTRODUCTION

In California State Council of Carpenters v. Associated
General Contractors of California,l the Ninth Circuit held that
the union's allegations of an employers' boycott of unionized
firms properly stated a cause of action under the Sherman Actand that the employers' conspiracy was not immune from antitrust liability by virtue of labor's antitrust exemptions.s

The California State Council of Carpenters (the \inion) represents carpenters and affiliated local unions in negotiating
master bargaining agreements with the Associated General Contractors of California (AGCC), a multi-employer bargaining
group.· The union sued the AGCC alleging the employer group
and its individual members had violated the Sherman Antitrust
Act by conspiring among themselves and with landowners and
other employers to hire only nonunionized subcontractors,' with
1. 648 F.2d 527 (9th Cir. 1980) (per Pregerson, J.; the other panel members were
Alarcon, J. and Sneed, J., dissenting) (rehearing and rehearing En Banc denied).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976). For relevant text of § 1, Bee text accompanying note 14
infra.
3. 648 F.2d at 540.
4. Id. at 529.
5. Id. at 529-30. The complaint alleged in paragraph XXIV that, inter alia, the defendants had conspired to, and had:
(3) Advocated, encouraged, induced and aided non-members of defendant Associated General Contractors of California, Inc., to refuse to enter into collective bargaining relationships with plaintiffs and each of them;
(4) Advocated, encouraged, induced, coerced, aided and
encouraged owners of land and other letters of construction
contracts to hire contractors and subcontractors who are not
signatories to collective bargaining agreements with plaintiff's
and each of them;
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the ultimate purpose of weakening and destroying the union.The union alleged actual damages of $25 million to be trebled to
$75 million.'
The district court granted the AGCC's motion to dismiss. It
determined that the union's claim essentially was that the
AGCC had "violated the antitrust laws insofar as they declined
to enter into agreements with plaintiffs to deal only with subcontractors which were signatories to contracts with plaintiffs.'"
The district court held the AGCC did not violate the antitrust
laws and that the type of agreement the union sought was "precisely the type of agreement which subjected the union in Con- .
nell to antitrust liability."8 The district court further held that a
union could not state a cause of action under the antitrust laws
against an employer "in the normal type of 'labor dispute" and
dismissed the complaint. lo
The Ninth Circuit reversed. It found that the district court
mischaracterized the union's complaint which, when properly
construed, did state a cause of action under the Sherman Act. n
The court also found that the employers' conduct was not exempt from antitrust liability simply because it arose in a labormanagement context. 11 The panel held that an employers' conspiracy which is ultimately aimed at weakening the union and
also restrains competition among parties outside the collective
bargaining relationship is actionable by the union under the
Sherman Act. 11
(5) Advocated, induced, coerced, encouraged, and aided
members of Associated General Contractors of California, Inc.,
non-members of Associated General Contractors, Inc., and
"memorandum contractors" to enter into 8ubcontracting
agreements with subcontractors who are not signatories to any
collective bargaining agreements with plaintiffs and each of
them.
Complaint at 7.
6. Id. at 8.
7. Id. at 9. Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides that any person has the right to
sue for treble damages "who shall be injured in his busineBB or property by reason of
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws." 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
8. 404 F. Supp. 1067, 1070 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
9. Id. (citing Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975».
10. 404 F. Supp. at 1070.
11. 648 F.2d at 532.
12. Id, at 540.

13.Id.
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The Ninth Circuit panel faced four main questions in California State Council:
(1) Did the allegations contained in the union's
complaint state a violation of the Sherman Act on
the part of the AGCC?
(2) Was this conduct exempt from the antitrust
laws because of labor's statutory exemption?
(3) Was this conduct exempt from the antitrust
laws because of labor's nonstatutory exemption?
(4) Did the union have standing to bring this
action?

B.

BACKGROUND

The Sherman Act and the Statutory Labor Exemption
The Sherman Act, passed in 1890, provides in part that
"[e]very contract, combination ... or conspiracy in restraint of
trade or commerce. . . is . . . illegal."14 While the Sherman Act
has been read broadly, III it does not reach every conspiracy restraining trade but is limited to those that affect commercial
competition. UI To restrict the courts from using the antitrust
laws as a means of controlling union conduct,1'7 Congress enacted
the Clayton Actl8 in 1914. Section 618 of that Act provides that
14. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
15. "The Statute does not confine its protection to consumers, or to purchasers, or
to competitors, or to sellers. . . . [It protects] all who are made victims of the forbidden
practices by whomever they may be perpetrated." Mandeville Island Farms v. American
Crystal Sugar, 334 U.S. 219, 236 (1948). See also Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores,
Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959) (conspiracy against one merchant held illegal); Fashion Originator's Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941) (~rcive group boycott restricting commercial
competition held illegal regardleB8 of its reasonableneB8).
16. Apex Hosiery v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940). See also Neeld v. National Hockey
League, 594 F.2d 442, 452 (9th Cir. 1979).
17. Loewe v. Lawlor (Danburry Hatters), 208 U.S. 274 (1908) (secondary boycott of
a manufacturer found to violate the Sherman Act). See D. LESLIE, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON LABOR LAW, 430 (1979) ("The Sherman Act was p88Bed ... to curtail busineBB monopolies ... [but it was initially) applied ... more often to union than to employer
busineB8 activity.").
18. Act of Oct. 15, 1914, Pub. L. No. 212, 38 Stat. 730 (current version at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 12-27, 44 (1976); 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1976».
19. Section 6 of the Clayton Act provides:
The labor of a human being is not a commodity or articl/!
of commerce. Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be
construed to forbid the existence and operation of labor ...
organizations. . . or to forbid or restrain individual members
of such organizations from lawfully carrying out the legitimate
objects thereof; nor shall such organizations or the members
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human labor is not a commodity or article of commerce and that
the antitrust laws are not to be used to proscribe the lawful activities of a union. Section 2()1° restricts the use of the injunction
by federal courts in labor disputes and lists certain labor activities which are not to be held violative of any federal statute.
The courts, however, continued to use the antitrust laws to
contr.ol union activity;1l Congress responded with the Norris-LaGuardia ActlJ in 1932. Declaring a public policy in favor of employee self-organization,·· Norris-LaGuardia further limits the
federal judiciary's power to enjoin activities in labor disputes.·4
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),II passed in 1935, esthereof, be held or construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under the antitrust laws.
15 U.S.C. § 17 (1976).
20. Section 20 provides:
No restraining order or injunction shall be granted by any
court of the United States ... in any case between an employer and employees . . . involving . . . a dispute concerning
terms or conditions of employment, unless neceSBal'Y to prevent ineparable injury to property or to a property right. . . .
And no such restraining order or injunction shall prohibit
any person or persons, whether singly or in concert, from terminating any relation of employment, or from ceasing to perform any work or labor, or from recommending, advising, or
persuading others by peaceful means so to do ... or to employ any party to such dispute, or from recommending, advising, or persuading others by peaceful and lawful means so to
do;
. . . nor shall any of the acts specified in this paragraph
be considered or held to be violations of any laws of the
United States.
29 U.s.C. I 52 (1976).
21. Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering. 254 U.S. 443 (1921) (no antitrust immunity for union which departed from "legitimate" objectives). See also Coronado Coal v.
United Mine Workers, 268 U.S. 295 (1925).
22. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1976).
23. 29 U.S.C. § 102 (1976). Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago R. & I.R. Co.,
353 U.S. 30. 40 (1957) ("The Nonia-LaGuardia Act ... was designed primarily to protect working men in the exercise of organized, economic power, which is vital to all collective bargaining.").
24. Section 13(c) defines a labor dispute as "any controversy concerning terms or
conditions of employment or concerning the association or representation of persons in
negotiating. . . conditions of employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in
the proximate relation of employer and employee. II 29 U.S.C. I 113(c) (1976).
Section 4 provides in part: "No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to
issue any ... injunction in any case growing out of any labor dispute ...." 29 U.S.C.
• 104 (1976).
25. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976).
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tablished the national policy in favor of collective bargaining
and set forth a statutory framework regulating the collective
bargaining process. Thereafter, the Supreme Court was faced
with the problem of resolving the fundamental conflict between
the antitrust laws-designed to promote competition-and the
labor laws-intended to promote unionization and collective
bargaining, and to eliminate competition over wages and working conditions.I I
In Apex Hosiery v. Leader,1'1 the Supreme Court held the
Sherman Act inapplicable to a union's strike. Although the
strike did restrain trade, it did not have as its purpose the reduction of commercial competition in the product market. Ie The
Court found that the Sherman Act did not prohibit the elimination of competition based on differing wages and working conditions.1e The Court did not reach the question of whether the
Clayton or Norris-LaGuardia Acts statutorily exempted the
union's conduct. 80
The Court first recognized a specific statutory exemption for
union activity in United States v. Hutcheson. 81 According to
Hutcheson, the Norris-LaGuardia Act and section 20 of the
Clayton Act, read together with the Sherman Act, determine
what type of union conduct is exempt.1I AB long as "a union acts
26. Allen Bradley Co. v. IBEW Local 3, 325 U.S. 797, 806 (1945). Comment, Antitrust Law in the Lobor-Management Context: The Employer 08 Defendant and the
Union 08 Plaintiff, 32 BAYLOR L. REv. 385 (1980).
27. 310 U.S. 469 (1940).
28. Id. at 500-01.
29. Id. at 503-04.
30. One commentator noted that:

[Justice) Stone was careful to say, however, that his test
did not vary depending on the nature of the alleged wrongdoer, whether union or management. The Apex Hosiery approach was not a matter of a statutory union exemption; the
Sherman Act as written, would simply not apply to a certain
class of restraints. Employers, or employers in combination
with unions, would presumably be as free as unions acting
alone to halt competition grounded in wage differentials. In
short, the Sherman Act would be confined to restraints on the
product market, and the labor market would be beyond its
ken.
St. Antoine, Connell: Antitrust Low at the Expense of Lobor Low, 62 VA. L.
606 (1976) (footnotes omitted).
31. 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
32. Id. at 231.
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in its self-interest and does not combine with non-labor groups"
its activities are exempt from antitrust scrutiny."
The Nonstatutory Exemption

The statutory exemption is limited to unilateral union conduct. M The Court has utilized a nonstatutory balancing approach to decide if anticompetitive provisions in collective bargaining agreements should be exempted.I I The Court applied
this nonstatutory balancing approach in Connell Construction
Co. v. Plumbers Local 100,·' a case that figures prominently in
California State Council. Local 100 had picketed Connell, a general contractor, to force it to agree to subcontract its plumbing
work only to subcontractors whose employees were represented
by Local 100.17 Connell signed the agreement under protest and
then sued to block its enforcement, claiming it violated the
Sherman Act. The Supreme Court held that no labor exemption
applied to Local 100's conduct and remanded for a determination as to whether the agreement in fact violated the Sherman
Act.1S
33. 1d. at 232. In Allen Bradley Co. v. IBEW Local 3, 325 U.S. 797 (1945), the Court
denied the statutory exemption to a union which combined with employers in fixing
markets and prices. The Court found that a union loses its statutory exemption if it
combines with business in carrying out activities which, if conducted by the business
alone, would violate the antitrust laWi. "We know that Congress feared the concentrated
power of business organizations to dominate markets and prices. It intended to outlaw
business monopolies. A business monopoly is no less such because a union participates,
and such participation is a violation of the Act." 1d. at 811. See generally L. SULLIVAN,
HANDBOOK or THE LAw or AlmTauST 724 (1977).
34. Employer conduct may be exempted if it is specifically covered by statute. See
§ 4(b) of the Norris·LaGuardia Act which exempts the act of becoming a member of an
employer organization. 29 U.S.C. I 104 (1976).
35. Meat Cutters and Butchers Local 189 v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965);
United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965). The Jewel Teo Court found
that a collective bargaining agreemant is exempt if it is: (1) intimately related to wages,
hOUlS or working conditions; (2) in the union's self interest; and (3) not intended to harm
employers outside the collective bargaining relationship. When these conditions are met,
the Court found national labor policy outweiahs the antitrust interest in promoting com·
petition and the provision will be exempt. The Court held a provision in a collective
bargaining agreement with a multi-employer group limiting marketing hours of grocery
stores exempt since it fit all three criteria. In Pennington, the union was found to have
forfeited its antitrust exemption when it "agreed with one set of employers to impose a
certain wage scale on other bargaining units." 381 U.S. at 665. The provision was intended to drive marginal coal operators out of business to the benefit of both the union
and large coal operators.
36. 421 U.S. 616 (1975).
37. 1d. at 619-21.
38. 1d. at 635, 637.
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Connell found labor's statutory exemption limited to unilateral union action. all However, Connell explicitly acknowledged
that a "limited nonstatutory exemption from antitrust sanctions" existed to make a "proper accommodation between the
Congressional policy favoring collective bargaining under the
. NLRA and the congressional policy favoring free competition."·o
"The nonstatutory exemption has its source in the strong labor
policy favoring the association of employees to eliminate competition over wages and working conditions."u

The Court held the ponstatutory exemption inapplicable to
Local 100's agreement because the agreement neither resulted
from collective bargaining nor limited itself to eliminating competition over wages and working conditions.4I It was not a collective bargaining agreement since Local 100 did not represent
Connell's employees. 48 The agreement also restricted competition more than was necessary to simply eliminate differences in
labor standards. The agreement required Connell to subcontract
only to those firms which had signed collective bargaining agreements with Local 100, rather than just to those firms which met
union standards in wages and working conditions.··
The Connell Court also held that the NLRA does not provide the exclusive remedies for this type of conduct since "federal courts may decide labor law questions that emerge as collateral issues in suits brought under independent federal remedies
including the antitrust laws. "411
39. Id. at 622·23. A union IOS88 the statutory exemption when it combines with a
non·labor group-even in the context of collective bargaining.
40. Id. at 622.
41. Id. One commentator noted:
Curiously, Justice Powell did not cite Apex Hosiery where
the nonstatutory exemption apparently originated and where
it received its fullest explication. Perhaps Justice Powell
wished to limit the nonstatutory exemption to situations in·
volving union activity, rather than embrace Justice Stone's
more expansive concept that the Sherman Act simply does not
reach a certain class of labor market restraints whether im·
posed by labor or management.
St. Antoine, supra note 30, at 618 n.64.
42. 421 U.S. at 622.
43. Id. at 619.
44. Id. at 620.
45. Id. at 626 (footnote omitted). One commentator argued that Connell's holding
that the remedies provided in the labor statutes were not exclusive would make it much
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Connell's significance is twofold. First, it explicitly recognizes a non-statutory exemption from the antitrust laws for collective bargaining over wages and working conditions.· e Second,
it does not limit the remedies available to unions and employers
to those provided in the labor statutes but instead allows suits
under other appropriate statutes including the antitrust laws.·'
The Labor Exemption Applied to Employer Conduct

The Ninth Circuit in California State Council faced the issue of when employer conduct should be exempted from the antitrust laws.
The Supreme Court held, in Anderson v. Shipowners Association,48 that an employer combination directed against employees can violate the antitrust laws. The Court found an alleged employer conspiracy to control employment practices
through the use of a hiring registry potentially violated the
Sherman Act because it restrained competition among employers in their employment practices.·'

In Cordova v. Bache & CO.,IO the New York district court
applied the antitrust laws to an alleged employer conspiracy directed against employees although the conspiracy did not otherwise affect commercial competition. III The court found an alleged conspiracy among stock brokerage firms to reduce the
commissions paid to stockbrokers violates the antitrust laws in
the same manner as a price-fixing agreement. III Section 6 of the
Clayton Actll8 did not exempt the employer conspiracy because
section 6 "was aimed at preserving labor's right to organize, not
easier for unions to sue employers for antitrust violations. Goldberg, Antitrust: The
Union as Plaintiff, SOUTHWESTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION, LABOR LAW DEVELOPMENTS, PROCBBDINGS 0' THE 26TH ANNUAL INSTIT\ITB ON LABOR LAw, 175, 177-82 (1980).
46. This distinction between statutory and non-statutory exemptions was described
as "unfortunate" by two commentators who found all labor exemptions to be derived
from statutes and felt the distinction could lead to mischievous results. 1 P. ARBBDA & D.
TuRNER, ANTITRUST LAW 191-93 (1978).
47. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 33, at 729-31.
48. 272 U.S. 359 (1926).
49. 1d. at 363.
50. 321 F. Supp. 600 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
51. 1d. at 606.
52.1d.
53. Section 6 provides: "The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of
commerce." 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1976).
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that of capital. "114 The court found that only in the context of
collective bargaining, or actions reasonably related to the collective bargaining process, are multi-employer combinations properly shielded from antitrust scrutiny. II
This exemption for collective bargaining extends beyond the
contract itself. In Clune v. Publishers' Association of New York
City," a multi-employer group's lockout in response to a whipsaw strike was seen as reasonably incident to the collective bargaining process and thus immune from the antitrust laws." The
court interpreted the LaGuardia Act and section 20 of the Clayton Actll8 as shielding the employer lockout from the antitrust
laws. lIs
The Clune court alternatively found no Sherman Act violation because the employer agreement did not restrain commercial competion. so For the same reason, other courts have held
that the use of strike insurance by an employer groupS 1 or the
refusal to bargain with a unionS. does not violate the Sherman
Act. sa Rather than interpreting federal labor policy as exempting
the employer conduct, these courts have followed the approach
54. 321 F. Supp. at 607. The court argued that had Congress intended to exempt
employer conduct as well it could have "provided that compensation offered or paid by
employers to employees is not a commodity or article of commerce. This it did not do."
Id. at 606. The court discussed in detail the purposes and legislative history of the Clayton Act.
55. Id. at 607. See also Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir.
1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. SOl (1977); Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n, 389
F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). The Mackey court found no labor exemption for employers except in the context of collective bargaining and then only if the collective bargaining agreement provision restrains competition primarily among the parties to the agreement. According to Robertson, the statutory labor exemption applies only to union
activities and the nonstatutory labor exemption applies to employers only in connection
with collective bargaining agreements. But see Clothing and Textile Workers v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 475 F. Supp. 482 (S.D. N.Y. 1979), vacated 08 moot, 638 F.2d 7 (2d Cir.
19SO), discussed in text accompanying notes 66 and 67 infra.
56. 214 F. Supp. 520 (S.D.N.Y.), alf'd per curiam, 314 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1963).
57. Id. at 524.
58. Section 20 of the Clayton Act proscribes injunctions against any person for
"ceasing ... to employ any party ... to [a labor) dispute." 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1976).
59. 214 F. Supp. at 528-29.
60. Id. at 524-25.
61. Kennedy v. Long Island R.R. Co., 319 F.2d 366, 373 (2d Cir. 1973).
62. Prepmore Apparel, Inc. v. Clothing Workers, 431 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1970).
63. See also Schatte v. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, 182
F.2d 158 (9th Cir. 1950) (alleged conspiracy to force other employers to hire members of
a rival union did not violate the Sherman Act).
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suggested in Apex Hosiery that the Sherman Act simply does
not reach the labor market. et This idea of a labor market per se
immunity8& can lead to erroneous results if applied to employer
conduct outside the collective bargaining process.
In Clothing and Textile Workers v. J.P. Stevens & Co.,e8
the court held an alleged employer conspiracy to fix wages as
part of an anti-union campaign not violative of the antitrust
laws because it only restrained competition in the labor market
and not in the product market. 87 This holding was in error. The
Supreme Court made it clear in Anderson that the antitrust
laws apply to employer conspiracies restraining competition in
the labor market as well as in the product market."
A better approach than the mechanical labor market per se
test is to balance the policies involved. 88 To determine whether
employer conduct is exempt, the degree of interference with federallabor law policy that would result if the antitrust claim were
allowed is balanced against the magnitude of the restraint of
trade and whether competition is interfered with directly or indirectly.70 Under this approach, employer combinations are immune from antitrust scrutiny if they have no anticompetitive effect unrelated to collective bargaining.71 But employers who
combine to restrict competition in the labor market outside the
collective bargaining process should be found liable under the
antitrust laws since protecting this conduct does not further federal labor law policies and frustrates the antitrust policy of promoting competition.
64. 310 U.S. 469 (1940). But see id. at 487.
65. "No one seriously suggests that antitrust policy should be concerned with the
labor market per se." Cox, Labor and the Antitrust Laws-A Preliminary Analysis, 104
U. PA. L. REV., 252, 254 (1955). See also Comment, supra note 26, suggesting that the
courts have created a quasi-statutory exemption for employers.
66. 475 F. Supp. 482 (S.D. N.Y. 1979), vacated as moot, 638 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1980).
67. Id. at 488-90. See Carroll v. Protection Maritime Ins. Co., 512 F.2d 4, 9 (1st Cir.
1975) (antitrust laws do not apply to conspiracies aimed at labor market); National Constructors Aas'n v. National Electrical Contractors, 498 F. Supp. 510, 532 (D.C. Md. 1980)
(dictum) (labor market excluded from antitrust regulation altogether).
68. 272 U.S. at 363.
69. Meat Cutters Local 15i6 v. Wetterau Foods, 597 F.2d 133 (8th Cir. 1979).
70. Id. at 136.
71. Id. The court held a retail grocery store's use of strikebreaking employees loaned
by a wholesale food supplier exempt from antitrust sanctions because it had no effect on
competition outside the collective bargaining negotiations.
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Standing

The Ninth Circuit panel also had to determine whether the
union had the requisite standing to bring an antitrust action.
Section 4 of the Clayton Act states that anyone who is "injured
in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in
the antitrust laws" may sue for treble damages.71
The courts, fearing endless litigation and unreasonable
damage awards if section 4 was read literally, have developed
various standing tests to limit who can bring antitrust suits."
The Ninth Circuit uses the "target area" test to determine
standing. 74 A plaintiff in this circuit may sue if he is within that
area of the economy threatened by a "breakdown of competitive
conditions" as a result of the antitrust violation.'11 A plaintiff has
standing if his injury was foreseeable.'"
Unions generally have standing if they are the intended victims of a conspiracy to restrain trade." Unions also have a suffi72. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
73. Courts have followed either the "direct injury," "target area" or "zone of interests" test. The most conservative is the direct injury test which requires an immediate
connection between the plaintiff and the antitrust violator. Standing is denied if an intermediate victim stands between the parties. Nationwide Auto Appraiser Serv., Inc. v.
Association of Cas. & Sur. Cos., 382 F.2d 925 (lOth Cir. 1967) (franchisor denied standing); Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704 (3d Cir. 1910) (shareholder denied standing). The zone of interests test is the most liberal. Followed in the Third and Sixth
Circuits, this approach requires that each case be analyzed individually. U[TJhe nature of
the industry in which the alleged antitrust violation exists, the relationship of the plaintiff to the alleged violator, and the alleged effect of the antitrust violation upon the
plaintiff" are all considered in determining whether allowing the particular plaintiff to
bring suit will effectuate .. 'the fundamental purpose of the antitrust laws.' " Cromar Co.
v. Nuclear Materials & Equip. Corp., 543 F.2d 501, 506 (3d Cir. 1967) (quoting In re
Multidistrict Air Pollution, 481 F.2d 122, 125 (9th Cir. 1973)). Accord, Bravman v. Bassett Furniture Indus., Inc., 552 F.2d 90, 99 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 823 (1977);
Malamud v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 521 F.2d 1142 (6th Cir. 1975). See generally, 2 P. ARODA
& D. TURNER, supra note 46, at 160-62.
74. Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F.2d 358, 365 (9th Cir. 1955).
75. Conference of Studio Unions v. Lowe's Inc., 198 F.2d 51, 54-55 (9th Cir. 1951),
cert. denied, 342 U.S. 919 (1952). See also Contreras v. Grower Shipper Vegetable Ass'n
of Cent. Cal., 484 F.2d 1346 (9th Cir. 1973) (farmworkers denied standing to sue growers
because they were only incidental victims of alleged price fixing scheme); accord, Gutierrez v. E. & J. Gallo Winery Co., 604 F.2d 645 (9th Cir. 1979).
76. In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191, 199 (9th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 919 (1974).
77. Tugboat, Inc. v. Mobile Towing Co., 534 F.2d 1172 (5th Cir. 1976); International
Ass'n of Heat and Frost Insulators v. United Contractors Ass'n, 483 F.2d 384 (3d Cir.
1973).
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cient business interest in organizing and representing employees
to meet the Clayton Act's requirement of an injury to the private litigant's "business or property. "'78
C.

COURT's ANALYSIS

The Sherman Act Claim

The panel held that the union had properly alleged a violation of the Sherman Act. 79 The AGCC's alleged conspiracy with
landowners and others to boycott unionized subcontractors and
hire only non unionized subcontractors potentially violated the
Sherman Act's prohibition against restraints on commercial
competition. 80 The panel found the union's allegations presented
"the obverse of the situation described in Connell."8l The
AGCC's alleged conduct would have the effect of restraining
competition among subcontractors and excluding unionized subcontractors from receiving bids even if they were more efficient
than their non unionized counterparts. Because the Supreme
Court in Connell had found such conduct on the part of a union
could violate the Sherman Act, the Ninth Circuit panel held
that the AGCC's alleged conduct could also form the basis for an
antitrust claim unless otherwise exempted.8I The fact that the
AGCC's alleged conduct might also violate the National Labor
Relations Act did not preclude an antitrust suit.8 '
The Statutory Exemption

The panel next examined the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts to determine if they could be construed as exempting
the alleged employer conduct. Section 20 of the Clayton Act exempts from antitrust scrutiny anyone who, in the course of a
dispute over conditions of employment, ceases to employ another party or recommends that others do SO.84 The panel stated
78. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976). See Tugboat, Inc. v. Mobile Towing Co., 534 F.2d 1172,
1176 (5th Cir. 1976); International Ass'n of Heat and Frost Insulators v. United Contractors Ass'n, 483 F.2d 384, 394 (3d Cir. 1973).
79. 648 F.2d at 532.
SO. ld. at 531.
81. ld. at 532.
82.ld.
83. ld. n.6.
84. 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1976). Section 20 of the Clayton Act does not define the phrase
"dispute concerning terms or conditions of employment." Therefore, the definition of
"labor dispute" found in § 13(c) of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 113(c) (1976),
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that section 20 could conceivably be interpreted as exempting
the AGCC's alleged conduct. Under this view, the AGCC could
be seen as simply recommending to others in the course of a
labor dispute not to hire unionized subcontractors."
However, the panel found that to interpret section 20 of the
Clayton Act as exempting antiunion conduct by employers
"would be totally inconsistent with the pro-labor purpose for
which section 20 was enacted."88 Section 20 was enacted primarily to protect unions from antitrust scrutiny.8'7 However, unions
can lose this exemption if they combine with business in anticompetitive conduct. Therefore, the panel found that "if the
statutory exemption is inapplicable to business group conspiracies involving unions, the exemption cannot be read to immunize
anticompetitive conduct on the part of employers acting
alone."88
According to the panel, the Clayton Act's exemptions were
rendered superfluous by the broader exemptions of Norris-LaGuardia. 8e Since the AGCC's conduct did not fall within any of
the situations listed in Norris-LaGuardia, it could not be statutorily exempted from the antitrust laws. eo
The panel concluded that it would be contrary to the purposes of the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts to exempt from
the antitrust laws an employer conspiracy to boycott unionized
subcontractors.81
has been incorporated into § 20. United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 231 (1941).
The panel determined that the AGCC's conspiracy could arguably be seen as arising in
the course of a labor dispute since it involved "terms or conditions of employment" or
"the association or representation of persons" regarding employment. 648 F.2d at 534.
85. 648 F.2d at 533-34.
86. [d. at 533.
87. [d. at 533-36.
88. [d. at 534.
89. [d. at 534-35.
90. [d. at 535. Section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act provides that no injunction
shall issue in any labor dispute to prohibit any person from (a) ceasing to work or remain
in any relation of employment, (b) becoming a member of any labor or employer organization, (c) paying or ceasing to pay benefits to anyone involved in a labor dispute, (d)
aiding a person involved in a labor law suit, (3) publicizing a labor dispute, (0 peaceably
assembling or (g) advising or agreeing with another person to do or not do any of the acts
specified above. 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1976).
91. 648 F.2d at 536.
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The Nonstatutory Exemption
The panel explained that Connell82 had made clear that the
nonstatutory exemption could apply only to cases concerning
collective bargaining agreements between unions and employers
on wages and working conditions. Because the AGCC's alleged
conduct neither involved a collective bargaining agreement nor
confined itself to wages or working conditions, the nonstatutory
exemption could not apply.'s
Standing
The panel stated that, to have standing to sue under section
4 of the Clayton Act, a private antitrust litigant must show the
injury was both factually and legally caused by the antitrust violation." The union met the factual causation requirement by alleging that the AGCC's conspiracy caused injury to its business
interests in organizing employees, negotiating collective bargaining agreements and securing jobs for its members.,a
The legal causation requirement limits standing to those
whose injury is "of the type that the antitrust laws [are] intended to prevent.''" The panel applied the target area test for
legal causation and held the union's allegations met that requirement as well." Not only was it foreseeable to the AGCC
that the union would be damaged by its boycott of unionized
subcontractors, that was the intended result. Because the union
was "not only hit, but was aimed at,"'s the target area test was
met."
92. 421 U.S. 616 (1975). For a discU88ion of Connell, see notes 36-47 supra and accompanying text.
93. 648 F.2d at 536.
94. 1d. at 536·37.
95. Id. at 537.
96.ld.
97. Id. at 538.
98. 1d. at 537 (quoting Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F.2d 358, 365 (9th
Cir. 1955».
99. The court stated in dictum that it might in the future use the more liberal zone
of interests test for standing to better effectuate the policies of allowing a compensatory
remedy to those harmed by antitrust violators and providing better enforcement of the
antitrust laws by private parties. 648 F.2d at 538 n.18.
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The Dissent

The dissent agreed with the district court's characterization
of the complaint and insisted that this was properly a labor, not
an antitrust case. 100 The district court had found that the plaintiffs actually alleged defendants violated the antitrust laws by
refusing to deal only with unionized subcontractors.10l The dissent stated that to allow this lawsuit would permit the union to
achieve exactly what Connell sought to prohibit. Nonunionized
subcontractors would be excluded from the market because general contractors would fear antitrust litigation if they dealt with
anyone other than subcontractors who had signed collective bargaining agreements with the plaintiffs. lOS
The dissent argued that even if the district court's characterization of the complaint was too narrow, the union still had
no antitrust claim because there was no restraint upon commercial competition in the marketing of goods or services. Injury to
a union's organizational and representational efforts without
more did not state a claim under the antitrust laws, but instead
fell under the terms of the National Labor Relations Act. loa
According to the dissent, the majority had tried to fit the
complaint under the Sherman Act by finding an alleged injury
to two groups of employers. First were those employers who
would otherwise have entered into a collective bargaining agreement with the plaintiffs but for the conspiracy. The dissent argued there was no injury at all to these employers because they
could make more profit by remaining non unionized. Thus there
was no restraint in commercial competition in violation of the
antitrust laws and the union's only remedy lay under the labor
laws. 1M
As to the second group of employers, those who were al-

ready unionized and were being denied contracts because of the
alleged injury, a significant injury was cognizable under the antitrust laws. But this raised a standing problem. The dissent argued that the target area test should only give standing to those
100. Id. at 543.
101. 404 F. Supp. at 1070.
102. 648 F.2d at 541.
103. Id. at 541·42.
104. Id. at 542.
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directly harmed by the alleged boycott and not to the employees
of the victim as well. 1011
The dissent concluded that even if the union had standing,
this still was "a labor case wearing an antitrust costume .... It
should remain a labor case. "106
The Modified Opinion

The AGCC's petition for a hearing and suggestion for a rehearing en banc was denied. In response to the AGCC's suggestion that the panel's opinion "could be read as disapproving
multi-employer bargaining entirely,"107 the panel clarified its
original opinion.
The panel noted that multi-employer bargaining had been
sanctioned by both the National Labor Relations Board and the
Supreme Court.1011 Further, the union had alleged injury not
from the formation of a multi-employer group but from the
AGCC's group boycott.1"
The panel stated that only employer agreements with an
anticompetitive purpose or effect violate the Sherman Act.
Multi-employer unit bargaining with a union to eliminate competition over wages and working conditions cannot give rise to
an antitrust claim. no And, even if the Sherman Act covered
multi-employer bargaining units, section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act,111 read together with section 20 of the Clayton
105. [d. at 543.
106. [d. The court in Carpenters Local 1846 v. Pratt-Farmsworth, 511 F. Supp. 509,

521 (E.D. La. 1981), found the dissent's opinion in California State Council "enlightening." The Pratt-Farmsworth court dismissed a union's complaint that an employer had
violated the antitrust laws by setting up an alter ego corporation to avoid dealing with
the union. The court found that an employer conspiracy to impair a union's representational efforts could only be remedied under the labor laws since it did not restrain commercial competition. It agreed with the dissent in California State Council that the antitrust laws should not be applied to employer conspiracies aimed at unions.
107. 648 F.2d at 543.
108. [d. at 543-44. Multi-employer bargaining units can only be formed if the employers agree to it, the union consents and the NLRB approves. 18-C T. KHEEL, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS, LABOR LAW § 14.03(4)(b) (1979).
109. 648 F.2d at 544.
110. [d.

Ill. 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1976).
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Act,112 clearly exempts from the antitrust laws the act of
"[b]ecoming or remaining a member ... of an employer
organization. "118
The panel concluded that an employer agreement violates
the Sherman Act only if it has "an anti competitive purpose or
effect on some aspect of competition other than competition
over wages or working conditions."114
The dissent criticized the majority's additional OpIniOn,
finding it did nothing to clarify what conduct by a multi-employer bargaining unit would violate the Sherman Act. The dissent thought the majority erred in allowing the antitrust laws to
intrude into labor relations rather than confining the remedies
to those provided in the labor laws.1lI
D.

CRITIQUE

The result reached in California State Council seems correct. The district court mischaracterized the complaint by stating that the union was suing AGCC for refusing to deal exclusively with subcontractors which were signatories to contracts
with the union.118 The Ninth Circuit correctly characterized the
complaint as alleging that the AGCC and its members had conspired with other employers and with each other to subcontract
only with nonunion subcontractors.l17 If at trial the union cannot prove a group boycott of unionized subcontractors, its claim
will fail on the merits. However, it would be improper to dismiss
the complaint at the pleading stage by construing it too
narrowly.lls
The majority also correctly held that the union's allegations
stated a claim under the Sherman Act. The alleged conspiracy
restrained commercial competition by excluding unionized subcontractors from the market. They would be excluded from con112. [d. § 52.
113. [d. § 104(b).

114. 648 F.2d at 544.
115. [d. at 545. The dissent listed a number of scenarios which he thought might

subject multi-employer groups to antitrust liability as a result of the majority's opinion.
See text accompanying note 125 infra for one scenario discussed by the dissent.
116. 404 F. Supp. at 1070.
117. 648 F.2d at 531.
118. Walling v. Beverly Enterprises, 476 F.2d 393 (9th Cir. 1973).
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tracts not because they were necessarily less efficient but because they were unionized. Connell had found that this type of
restraint on competition could form the basis for an antitrust
claim. 111 The purpose of the antitrust laws is to outlaw all conspiracies that unreasonably restrain commercial competition, regardless of motive. ISO A group boycott which has as its ultimate
goal the weakening of a union is nevertheless covered by the antitrust laws if it restrains commercial competition. The district
court stated that an antitrust cause of action alleged by a union
against an employer in the normal type of labor dispute could
not be recognized. 1I1 It erroneously determined that, in the labor-management context, the antitrust laws apply only to agreements between unions and employers which affect commercial
competition among third parties. III Simply because the cases decided by the Supreme Court have involved union agreements
with employers· that affected competition among third parties11a
should not be interpreted to mean that employer combinations
that are directed against unions and also affect commercial competition are somehow exempt. Employer combinations enjoy an
immunity from the antitrust laws only when they are part of the
collective bargaining process. But this was not an instance of
employers combining as part of that process to counter a union's
whipsaw strike or other pressure tactic. m The AGCC's alleged
conspiracy arose outside the collective bargaining process and
affected commerce among third parties, i.e., the subcontractors.
It could not be held immune from antitrust coverage simply because it arose in the labor-management context. To hold otherwise would allow employers to freely restrict commercial competition among themselves or others as long as their ultimate
motive was to injure the union.
The majority's holding that the alleged employer conspiracy
potentially violated the Sherman Act will not lead to multi-em119. 421 U.S. at 635.
120. Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
121. 404 F. Supp. at 1070.
122. Id. at 1070-71.
123. Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Loca1 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975); Meat Cutters
and Butchers Local 189 v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965); United Mine Workers v.
Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Allen Bradley Co. v. IBEW Loca1 3, 325 U.S. 797
(1945).
124. See, e.g., Clune v. Publishers' Ass'n of New York City, 214 F. Supp. 520
(S.D.N.Y. 1963).
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ployer groups being unduly restricted in their choice of bargaining tactics, as the dissent feared. The dissent questioned
whether a multi-employer unit's decision to bargain aggressively
with a weak union in order to provoke a strike and ultimately
cause the union to lose its representative status through loss of
employee support could result in antitrust liability for the employers. 1211 It clearly would not for the same reason that employer agreements to purchase strike insurance or engage in a
lockout are not covered. Such employer agreements are immune
from the antitrust laws because they are part of the collective
bargaining process and do not affect outside parties. lie Only
multi-employer agreements that are made outside the collective
bargaining process or unduly affect third parties are subject to
antitrust sanctions.
The panel also correctly determined that labor's statutory
exemption did not protect the AGCC's alleged conduct. The
Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts were passed primarily to
benefit labor; any language found in them arguably exempting
employer conduct should be narrowly construed.
While the result reached by the panel on the statutory labor
exemption is correct, its analysis is questionable in part. The
panel first found that the alleged employer conduct arguably fell
within the language of section 20 of the Clayton Act which exempts from antitrust liability a recommendation by one person
to another to cease to employ any other party.U17 Because the
exemptions in the Norris-LaGuardia Act are broader than those
in the Clayton Act, the panel found the Clayton Act's exemptions superfluous; thus only the language of Norris-LaGuardia
need be examined. U8 The panel then concluded that the AGCC's
conduct was not statutorily exempt because none of Norris-LaGuardia's exempt categories applied. 111I It is an odd result to
state that Norris-LaGuardia is broader than the Clayton Act but
then find that Norris-LaGuardia does not exempt conduct which
125. 648 F.2d at 545.
126. See Plumbers Local 598 v. Morris, 511 F. Supp. 1298 (E.n. Wash. 1981) holding that an employer lockout is not subject to the antitrust law8. It distinguished California State Council on its facts. [d. at 1311-12.
127. 648 F.2d at 533-34.
128. [d. at 534-35.
129. [d. at 535.
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the Clayton Act arguably does. Furthermore, Norris-LaGuardia
provides that no injunction shall issue to prohibit any person
from "ceasing ... to remain in any relation of employment ...
or advising, urging or otherwise causing or inducing" anyone else
to do SO.180 This language seems as broad as that in the Clayton
Act. While the court properly concluded that in light of the purpose of this statute this exemption could not apply to the
AGCC's alleged conduct, it was improper to read the Norris-LaGuardia Act as exempting less than the Clayton Act.
The court correctly found that the union had standing to
bring the claim. A union's business is organizing and representing employees. It should be able to sue under the Clayton Act to
protect this interest just as any other business can sue to protect
its interests when endangered by a conspiracy violating the antitrust laws. Because the union was the intended victim, it clearly
fell within the target area of the employers' alleged conspiracy.
Congress created a private antitrust damage remedy to better
compensate the antitrust victim and provide better enforcement
against antitrust violators. 111 To deny standing to the intended
victim of an antitrust conspiracy would frustrate both of these
goals.

E.

IMPACT

California State Council establishes that the Ninth Circuit
will not recognize any !Clabor market per se" exe.mption to the
antitrust laws if an employer combination made outside the collective bargaining process aft'ects commercial competition among
third parties. The Ninth Circuit will hold such a combination
potentially liable to antitrust sanctions unless either the Clayton
or Norris-LaGuardia Acts clearly exempts the conduct or unless
it is a necessary part of collective bargaining over wages or working conditions.

However, it is not clear how the Ninth Circuit would rule in
a case such as Clothing and Textile Workers v. J.P. Stevens &
. Co.,18lI where the alleged employer combination restrained com130.
131.
L.J. 809,
132.

29 U.S.C. § 104 (1976).
Berger & Berstein, An Analytical Framework for Antitrust Standing, 86 YALE
845·58 (1977).
475 F. Supp. 482 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
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petition over wages but did not otherwise affect third parties.
Such a combination directly restrains competition among employers and should be held to violate the antitrust laws. ISS To
exempt such conduct frustrates the antitrust laws' purpose of
promoting competition and contravenes the labor law policies of
protecting employee self-organizing and promoting collective
bargaining.
However, the Ninth Circuit might find that the antitrust
laws do not apply to such employer combinations because they
do not affect competition among third parties: "[A]n employer
agreement falls within the prohibitions of the Sherman Act only
if it has an anti competitive purpose or effect on some aspect of
competition other than competition over wages or working conditions. "134 This statement was made in the context of a discussion of antitrust liability for multi-employer bargaining units
which were consented to by a union and approved by the NLRB.
But, standing alone, it could be interpreted as exempting all employer agreements regarding wages or working conditions regardless of whether they arise in a collective bargaining context.
This would lead to an anomalous result: A union could bring
antitrust claims against employers only when they conspire to
injure the union indirectly by restraining competition among
third parties; such claims would be barred against employers
who agree, outside the collective bargaining process, to restrain
competition over wages or working conditions and thereby injure
the union directly.
Employer immunity to antitrust sanctions is properly limited to the exceptions spelled out in the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts and actions which relate to the collective bargaining process. All other employer restraints on competition in the
labor market should be found potentially violative of the antitrust laws.
Richard Slizeski
133. Anderson v. Shipowners Ass'n, 272 U.S. 359, 364 (1926); Cordova v. Bache &
Co., 321 F. Supp. 600, 606 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
134. 648 F.2d at 544.
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II. NO DEFERRAL TO ARBITRATOR AWARDS IN SECTION 8(a)(3) CASES

A.

INTRODUCTION

In NLRB v. Max Factor and CO., l the Ninth Circuit reviewed the application of the Spielberg doctrine· favoring deferral by the National Labor Relations Board (the Board) to arbitrators' awards in cases involving charges of unfair labor
practices. 8 The court held that the Board had discretion to refuse deferral to an arbitrator's award which had denied reinstatement of ~ discharged union steward,· and affirmed the
Board's order of reinstatement. II Substantial evidence supported
the Board's finding that the employer discharged its employee
primarily because of her union activities,' and that the employee's conduct was not so flagrantly improper as to deprive
her of protection under the National Labor Relations Act (the
Act).' Allegations of discord between the employer and the employee did not overcome the Board's discretion to order
reinstatement.'
1. 640 F.2d 197 (9th Cir. 1980) (per Schwarzer, D.J. sitting by designation; the other
panel members were Goodwin and Pregerson, J.J.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 2314 (1981).
2. The doctrine draws its name from the Board decision in Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112
N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955). For a discU88ion of the doctrine, see notea 31 and 37 infra and
accompanying text.
3. National Labor Relations Act § 7 reads in part: "Employees shall have the right
to self.organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizationa, to bargain collectively
through reprel!8ntatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection . . . ." 29
U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
National Labor Relations Act §§ 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3), provide in part:
It shall be an unfair labor practice ror an employer(1) to interrere with, restrain, or coerce employees
in the exercise or the rights guaranteed in section 157 or
this title;

(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure or
employment or any term or condition of employment to
encourage or discourage membership in any labor or·
ganization . . . .
29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(l) and 158(a)(3) (1976).
4. 640 F.2d at 203.
5. rd. at 205.
6. rd. at 204.
7. rd. at 205.
8.

rd.
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In Max Factor, the Ninth Circuit has apparently declined
the invitation implicit in Douglas Aircraft Co. v. NLRB' to extend the Spielberg doctrine into areas of arguably unprotected
employee activity.

B.

FACTS OF THE CASE

Luisa Gratz was the chief union steward 10 for production
employees in Max Factor's Los Angeles plant. In late 1976 and
early 1977, she became embroiled in a series of conflicts with
management related to her conduct of union business on company time. Finally, after an explosive confrontation with Max
Factor's Personnel Manager, Gratz was discharged,l1 allegedly
9. 609 F.2d 352 (9th Cir. 1979). The court, in Doug/as Aircraft Co., ordered the
Board to defer to the arbitrator's award. For further discussion of the implications of
Douglas Aircraft see notes 65-70 infra and accompanying text.
10. Employees were represented by Warehouse, Processing and Distribution Workers Union, Local 26, International Longshoremen and Warehousemen's Union. Max Factor & Co., 239 N.L.R.B. 804, 805 (1978).
11. Gratz's discharge was not a sudden, isolated event but the final act in a series of
incidents, which showed a severe deterioration in the working relationship between
Gratz, representing the union, and company management-specifically Bill Piercy, Director of Industrial Relations, and James Bryant, Personnel Manager. A brief list of the
more unpleasant disputes between Gratz and Bryant and/or Piercy during the six month
period prior to Gratz's discharge illustrates the extent of conflict.
On August 11, 1976, Gratz called Bryant a "racist" in front of other employees during a discussion about the promotion of a black employee. John Lee, the union business
representative, later reprimanded Gratz. On November 10, Bryant had a heated discussion with Gratz in the company cafeteria, accusing her of upsetting the company nurse
80 severely that the nurse experienced a heart attack. Gratz filed a grievance against
Bryant, and Bryant later apologized. Piercy sent Gratz a warning letter on December 9,
advising her that she was devoting too much time on the job to chief steward duties and
not enough on production work.
During the morning of December 27, Bryant refused to give Gratz information relative to a pending arbitration matter even though the company had previously agreed to
furnish this material. Two hours later, Bryant issued Gratz an "Employee Warning Notice," signed by Piercy, again indicating Gratz was spending too little time on production
work. Gratz refused to sign the warning as requested and called Bryant a "big phoney"
and a "little twerp." At 4 p.m. the same day, Gratz was given another "Employee Warning Notice" signed by Bryant informing her she was suspended for "violation of plant
rule #39-uwe [sic) of profane and abusive language." The following day, December 28,
the union filed a grievance against the company..
On February 1, 1977, Gratz and Bryant disagreed on the amount of time Gratz could
take to discuss pending grievances with another union steward during working hours. At
the end of her shift, Gratz remained in the plant cafeteria eating with several employees.
Bryant observed this on his way out of the building. The following day, February 2,
Bryant and Gratz had an explosive confrontation. Bryant accused Gratz of conducting
an illegal union meeting the previous evening. The problem about the pending grievances
was again brought up. During the conversation, Gratz called Bryant a "liar." On February 3, Bryant discharged Gratz. Max Factor & Co., 239 N.L.R.B. at 807-13.
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for use of abusive language, insubordination and lack of production. 1I Gratz immediately filed unfair labor practice charges
against Max Factor with the Board. 18
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded that the
reasons given by Max Factor for Gratz's discharge were actually
pretextual; the real motive was Gratz's pursuit of protected activities as chief steward. 14 He further found that Max Factor violated section 8(a)(1) of the ActlD when it offered Gratz economic benefits if she would give up her union involvement. III
The ALJ also determined that Gratz's abusive conduct in the
course of her duties was not so flagrant as to forfeit the protection of the Act. n The Board subsequently adopted the findings
of the ALJ and ordered reinstatement and back pay.lS
Shortly after Gratz filed the unfair labor practice charges,
the union grieved the discharge under the contract, and took its
protest to arbitration. I i The arbitrator issued an opinion and
award while the findings of the ALJ were pending on exceptions
12. According to the "Employee Warning Notice," Gratz was discharged "for violation of plant rule 39 (uwe [sic] of abusive language) plant rule 19 (insubordination) and
failure to perform a reasonable amount of work." Max Factor & Co., 239 N.L.R.B. at 813.
13. [d.

14. The ALI said the reasons given by Max Factor were
[N)ot the real reason for Gratz' [sic] discharge but was a pretext used to cloak a discriminatory motive, hence, the discharge violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. Assuming
that I have erred in evaluating the record in this respect. . .,
I would still be constrained to conclude that Gratz' (sic) discharge violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
[d. at 818.
15. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(l) (1976).
16. The offer of economic benefits took place during October or November 1976 and
·occurred during a conversation between Gratz, Piercy and Bryant. According to Gratz's
testimony before the ALJ, Piercy asked if she would consider working for the company
in a management position or returning to law school if Max Factor paid her expenses.
Gratz refused both suggestions. Max Factor & Co., 239 N.L.R.B. at 814.
17. The ALI found Gratz's conduct to be spontaneous, and not a product of a conscious decision to undermine management's authority. Also, the conduct took place while
Gratz was engaged in protected activity, i.e., her duties as union steward. [d. at 819.
18. [d. at 820.
19. Normally, the grievance procedure delineated in the collective bargaining agreement would require that the grievance be settled at one of three levels with the company
organization in discussions between the grievant and the foreman (step I), the grievant's
steward and the personnel manager (step 2), or the Union's grievance committee and the
Company's Director of Industrial Relations (step 3). If the dispute was not resolved by
the weekly "third step" meeting. step 4 provided for binding arbitration. [d. at 806.
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before the Board. 20 The arbitrator found in favor of the company because Gratz's conduct and abusive language constituted
just cause for discipline and Gratz herself had contributed unnecessarily to the conflicts with management by her unjustified
and superior attitude. 21 In addition, the testimony of other chief
stewards as to the amount of time they used for union activities
convinced the arbitrator that Gratz had indeed spent an excessive amount of time on union business.2lI The arbitrator sustained Max Factor's contention that Gratz should have spent
more time on production work and found that her failure to do
so was a valid cause for discipline and discharge. 1S
Max Factor then unsuccessfully petitioned the Board to defer to the arbitrator's decision. U In turn, the Board and intervenor Gratz petitioned the Ninth Circuit for enforcement of the
Board's Order.III

C.

BACKGROUND

Policies in Conflict
The problem facing the Ninth Circuit in Max Factor was
the continuing tension and reSUlting debate which has developed
from the attempt to reconcile two apparently conflicting policies.
On the one hand) Congress has directed the Board to prevent
persons or organizations from engaging in unfair labor practices.1e On the other, the grievance and arbitration process has
won judicial and statutory favor as a desirable method for settling employment-related grievance disputes. I? In those cases
20. Id. at 804.
21. 640 F.2d at 201.
22. Id. However, the ALJ noted that while Max Factor had always paid the chief
steward for time spent on union business during working hours, the amount of time
necessary and appropriate had become the source of a continuing dispute since at least
1970. Max Factor & Co., 239 N.L.R.B. at 806.
The ALJ also found that various factors outside Gratz's control (massive lay-offs,
changes in the bargaining agreement increasing the number of forms and reports, and a
change in Max Factor's management personnel) added to her workload during this period and made it necessary for her to spend more time on union activities. Id. at 816.
23. 640 F.2d at 201.
24. 239 N.L.R.B. at 804.
25. 640 F.2d at 199.
26. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 151, 158 (1976).
27. For a general discussion of the duty of the parties to a collective bargaining
agreement to arbitrate, see R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW, UNIONIZATION AND
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, 540-74 (1976).
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where a party turns to the Board for redress, and at the same
time has access to a private solution through the grievance machinery available pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement,
the Board must decide whether a remedy can only be found
under the Act, or whether the Board will defer to arbitration.
Evolution of the Spielberg Doctrine

Arbitration has long been recognized as the method
whereby employers and the representatives of their employees
meet and resolve differences.I I Arbitration has been approved by
Congress;19 and granted judicial favor by the Supreme Court in
the "Steelworkers' Trilogy."ao
The Board also recognizes the role of the arbitrator in the
grievance process and, in some. instances, will defer to arbitrators' awards even though one of the antagonists in the labor dispute seeks a resolution of the grievance with the federal agency
itself. In Spielberg Manufacturing CO.,81 the Board enumerated
the criteria it uses to determine whether to retain jurisdiction or
defer to the arbitrator's award as: (1) the fairness and regularity
of the arbitration proceeding; (2) the presence or absence of an
agreement between all parties to be bound by the arbitrator's
award; and (3) whether the arbitrator's award is clearly repugnant to the Act.1I The Board added that this newly created policy of deference to arbitration awards would produce "the desirable objective of encouraging the voluntary settlement of labor
disputes. "aa
The trend toward deference to arbitration was given added
impetus by the Board in Collyer Insulated Wire. 14 In Collyer.
28. Professor Gorman believes that "our society ordinarily places a premium on the
resolution of disputes through private machinery freely created by the parties rather
than by the intervention of government." Id. at 729·30.
29. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1976), reads in part: "[AI contract ... to settle by arbitration 8
controversy thereafter arising out of such contract . . ., or an Bil'eement in writing to
submit to. arbitration an exillting controversy arising out of such. contract. . ., shall be
valid, irrevocable, and enforceable ...•"
30. United Steelworkers of Am. v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United
Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United
Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
31. 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955).

32. Id. at 1082.
33.1d.
34. 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971).
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the collective bargaining agreement provided for arbitration,
and, because the issues were contractual in nature, the Board
held arbitration to be the appropriate remedy.8~ However, no attempt at that option had been made by the parties. The Board
ruled it would nevertheless defer to arbitration, even without a
final arbitrator's award. s6
The Collyer ruling expanded the Spielberg position considerably. In Spielberg, the arbitration proceeding took place prior
to the hearing before the ALJ;S7 in Collyer, arbitration had not
yet occurred. 88 The Board retained jurisdiction over the dispute
in Collyer, but only to entertain a motion that arbitration did
not proceed as required under the Spielberg guidelines. s9
In National Radio CO.,40 the Board, in a three-to-two decision,n extended the pre-arbitration deferral doctrine of Collyer
to section 8(a)(3) cases. 42 The company in National Radio was
charged with anti-union animus when it discharged a union representative for refusing to comply with a unilaterally imposed
reporting condition required of him and other union stewards.4B
Following a change in Board membership," National Radio
35. 1d. at 837.
36. 1d. at 842.
37. In Spielberg, four employees pressed unfair labor practice charges against the
company when it failed to reinstate them at the direction of an arbitrator. The parties
had previously agreed to arbitrate the question and be bound by the arbitrator's decision. 112 N.L.R.B. at 1081. In Cary v. Westinghouse Corp., 375 U.S. 261, 272 (1964), the
Supreme Court found no barrier to the use of arbitration, even though the dispute might
eventually go to the Board.
38. 192 N.L.R.B. at 842.
39. 1d. at 843.
40. 198 N.L.R.B. 527 (1972).
41. Chairman Miller was joined by Board members Kennedy and Penello to form
the majority. Members Jenkins and Fanning dissented, as they did in Collyer. 1d. at 532.
See Simon-Rose, Deferral Under Collyer by the NLRB of Section 8(0)(3) Cases, 27
LAB. L.J. 201 (1976) for additional discussion of the expansion of Collyer in National
Radio.
42. 198 N.L.R.B. at 531.
43. 1d. at 527.
44. By 1977, the three Collyer advocates, Miller, Kennedy and Brown had left the
Board, and were replaced by Murphy, Penello and Walther. Members Penello and
Walther continued to hold the Collyer viewpoint. Now, however, Chairman Murphy
joined Jenkins and Fanning in support of a new approach to deferral to arbitration
awards. Jenkins and Fanning had previously dissented in Collyer and National Radio.
Id. at 810 n.7. See also Novack, Cutting Back On Collyer: The First Step in the Right
Direction, 28 LAB. L.J. 785 (1977).
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was overruled by General American Transportation CO.411 The
Board now appears to limit the occasions when it will defer to
an arbitrator's award to those situations analogous to
Spielberg:48 the award has already been issued by an arbitrator
and meets the Spielberg criteria.
Significantly, while the Board has deferred to arbitration, it
has never abdicated its statutory authority to those nonadministrative platforms. 47 The Board has always maintained that deference to arbitration awards would be granted at its discretion
and only when the clearly enumerated criteria of Spielberg were
present. Even after the expansion of the deferral policy under
Collyer, the Board has retained jurisdiction in order to assure
the Spielberg standards were met. Consequently, any arbitration
award under Collyer could still be reviewed. 411
D.

THE HOLDING OF

Max Factor

Deferral to Arbitration Denied under Spielberg

The Board, in its decision, ruled that the arbitration proceedings appeared to be fair and regular;49 thus, they met the
first Spielberg standard. llo The reason given by the Board, however, for not deferring was that such deferral "would engender a
result repugnant to the purposes and policies of the Act. "Ill
Writing for the Ninth Circuit panel, Judge Schwarzer ob45. 228 N.L.R.B. 808 (1977). Union steward Perry Soape, Jr., was laid off' by the
company. He claimed that General American was motivated by anti-union animus; the
company alleged its action was necessary because of lack of work. rd. at 813. In a threeto-two decision, the Board refused to defer to arbitration as requested by the company.
ld. at 808.
46. The majority opinion in General American criticized Collyer and its progeny,
but did not specifically denounce Spielberg. ld. at 809.
47. See, e.g., Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 1081 (1955) ("(Tlhe Board is
not bound, as a matter of law, by an arbitration award."); NLRB v. Walt Disney Prod.,
146 F.2d 44, 48 (9th Cir.) ("Clearly agreements between private parties cannot restrict
the jurisdiction of the Board."), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 877 (1944).
48. Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. at 843.
49. Max Factor & Co., 239 N.L.R.B. at 804.
50. The Ninth Circuit panel stated that the Board found the proceedings were fair
and regular, and that the parties had agreed to be bound by the arbitrator's award.
NLRB v. Max Factor and Co., 640 F.2d at 202. But no similar claim was made by the
Board. In addition, intervenor Gratz protested vigorously that she had not agreed to be
bound by the arbitrator's decision; she believed her best remedy lay with the Board.
Brief for Intervenor at 3-5.
51. 239 N.L.R.B. at 804 (emphasis added).
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served that the Board's decision failed to provide supporting
analysis for the potentially repugnant outcome of the arbitrator's award.1i2 However, the court relied on the Board's "considerable discretion" in this area and the findings amassed by the
ALJ which were reasonable and consistent with the preponderance of the evidence. liS Consequently, the court believed that the
Board could reasonably conclude that Max Factor had engaged
in unfair labor practices, and that the Board's duty to prevent
interference with the employee's protected activities overrode
the desirability of encouraging arbitration.1I4

Employee's Conduct Protected by the Act
Gratz's conduct, while probably improper, in the court's
view was still sheltered by the Act because it occurred while she
was engaged in protected activitylili and "was not so flagrantly
improper as to deprive her union activities of protection under
Section 8(a)(1) and (3)."1i6 The court compared Gratz's confrontation with her employer to an earlier Ninth Circuit case in
which an employee called his general manager a liar at a grievance meeting. 1i7 The court recognized that passionate, verbal explosions are not uncommon in labor disputes. 1i8 Gratz called Max
Factor's Personnel Manager a "liar," a "racist," a "big phoney"
and a "little twerp" on separate occasions, all in the context of
her union activities.1i8 Although her language was extreme, abusive and discourteous, the court found her manner not so totally
shocking to the sensitivities of those with whom she dealt so as
to forfeit the protection of the Act.80

E.

DISCUSSION AND CRITIQUE

An Emerging Trend in the Ninth Circuit
In Max Factor, the Ninth Circuit appears to be solidifying a
trend in this Circuit to uphold refusals by the Board to defer to
52. 640 F.2d at 204.
53.Id.
54. Id. n.7.
55. Id. at 205.
56.Id.
57. Id. (citing Hawaiian Hauling Servo Ltd. V. NLRB, 545 F.2d 674 (9th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 431 U.S. 965 (1977».
58. E.g., Hawaiian Hauling Servo Ltd. V. NLRB, 545 F.2d at 676 n.8.
59. For a detailed discussion of these incidents, see note 11 supra.
60. 640 F.2d at 205.
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arbitration, particularly in section 8(a)(3) cases.
The Ninth Circuit recognized the Board's continuing jurisdiction over section 8(a)(3) disputes as early as 1945 in NLRB v.
Walt Disney.s1 More recently, it held that the Board would not
abuse its discretion in refusing to defer, and that the Board's
decisions should be enforced, as long as the Board followed its
own standards. U
In Stephenson v. NLRB,S3 the court ruled that the Board
should not defer if the arbitrator has not decided the statutory
issues. Under those circumstances, the Board must review. The
Board may not presume that the arbitrator resolved the statutory issues; the record must clearly show that those questions
have been considered and answered.s4
Douglas Aircraft Co. v. NLRB,SD the Ninth Circuit decision
holding for deferral to the arbitrator's award, and the most recent decision by the Ninth Circuit in this line of cases, was distinguished in Max Factor.es In Douglas Aircraft, the court held
that the arbitrator's award must not be set aside where the arbitrator has based his decision on two independent grounds, one of
which is permissible, even though the alternative basis may be
impermissible. Under those circumstances, the award would not
be clearly repugnant to the Act." The ambiguity in Douglas Aircraft stemmed from the language of the arbitrator's award, not
from the conduct of the parties." Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit
61. 146 F.2d 44 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 877 (1944).
62. Hawaiian Hauling Servo Ltd. v. NLRB, 545 F.2d 674, 676 (9th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 965 (1977) ("In reviewing the Board, we must insure that it adheres to
its own standards until they are properly changed by the Board.").
63. 550 F.2d 535 (9th Cir. 1977).
64. Id. at 538. In Max Factor, the Ninth Circuit questioned whether the insistence
that statutory issues be clearly resolved as specified by Stephenson was misplaced. The
court described the issue as a "matter of deep controversy in the [arbitration) profession." 640 F.2d at 203 n.6.
65. 609 F.2d 352 (9th Cir. 1979).
66. 640 F.2d at 203.
67. Id. (citing Douglas Aircraft CO. V. NLRB, 609 F.2d at 355).
68. McMurphy, a discharged employee, filed unfair labor practice charges against
Douglas Aircraft Company, and a grievance with his union on the same day. The charge
was deferred to arbitration under the then-controlling Collyer policy. The union and the
company attempted to settle their dispute with McMurphy, one condition being his
withdrawal of the § 8(a)(3) charges pending before the NLRB. McMurphy refused. The
arbitrator's award granted reinstatement without back-pay. 609 F.2d at 353.
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chose not to impose the same standard on the Board in Max
Factor. 89
Douglas Aircraft arguably may be read as a very narrow
holding, applicable only in that situation where the arbitrator's
award is based on an ambiguous decision containing two or more
grounds which may be read either independently or cumulatively. The Max Factor court makes clear that similar ambiguity
is not present in the arbitrator's opinion here.'1° The Board's refusal to defer is not based on any lack of clarity but on the repugnance of the arbitrator's award to the Act.
Results Repugnant to the Act

The Ninth Circuit accepted the Board's finding that deferral to the arbitrator's award would result in an outcome repugnant to the purposes and policies of the Act, and would not afford the protection necessary for section 7 rights. This finding
alone is adequate to invalidate the award under the Spielberg
criteria, even if both additional standards are met. The major
problem with Max Factor, however, is that the court does not
elaborate with any specificity what test it has applied to define
results repugnant to the Act.'ll The court accepted at face value
the Board's determination that the arbitrator's award would creAt the request of the union and the company, the arbitrator clarified hiB re890ne for
the award. One reason for the refusal to order back-pay W89 the employee's pattern of
abusive conduct at work. The other W89 the employee's refusal to withdraw the unfair
labor practice charges. The court held that the Board must defer to the original award,
even though ambiguous, since clarification of that award revealed a permissible re89on.
The impermissible re890n W89 described by the court 89 "harmless error." Id. at 354.
69. At le89t one circuit has split with the Ninth over the implication of Douglas
Aircraft. See NLRB v. Pincus Bros. Inc.-Maxwell, 620 F.2d 367 (3d Cir. 1980) (citing
Douglas Aircraft in ordering deferral to an arbitrator's award which ruled on arguably
impermissible employee conduct). The discharged employee in Pincus abused work time
to write and distribute leaflets critical of her employer. The Third Circuit found that
permissible and impermissible re890ns for an award would not render the award clearly
repugnant to the Act. In addition, the actions of the employee in Pincus were arguably
unprotected in nature. The Ninth Circuit refused to follow Pincus for several re89ons,
the most compelling of which W89 the importance of relying on the protected status of
the employee's conduct. The employee in Max Factor W89 engaged in protected activity
which must not be interfered with. 640 F.2d at 204 n.7. In Ad Art, Inc. v. NLRB, 645
F.2d 669 (9th Cir. 1980) (89 amended Jan. 1981), the court again declined to follow Pincus. Here the court followed Max Factor in finding the Board properly refused to defer
to the arbitrator's award; the court ordered reinstatement and back pay to the employee
in enforcement of the Board's order.
70. 640 F.2d at 203.
71. Id. at 204.
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ate a repugnant result. The Board, unfortunately, gave no reasons and cited no facts in support of its position.72 The Board
merely stated that the arbitrator failed to pass on the unfair
labor practice considerations which the ALJ found to be
significant."78
The dissenting panel member noted that the Board failed to
discuss the reasons for its findings and recommended the case be
remanded for clarification by the Board.?4 The majority accepted the brief statement by the Board as sufficient. Nonetheless, future litigants in similar circumstances would have been
aided by a more specific discussion by the Board as to what conduct it finds worthy of protection in this difficult area.
F.

CONCLUSION

The outcome of this case hinges on the specific facts surrounding the discipline and discharge of Max Factor's union
steward. Max Factor pursued both permissible and impermissible purposes;?!! the court believed the impermissible motives
dominated. Gratz, for her part, committed arguably improper
actions during the course of protected activity.?e The court
found that her actions were not so blatantly improper as to forfeit all protection afforded her union activities by sections
8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3). The conduct of discharged employees and
the motives of their employers often fall into similar twilight areas of arguable impropriety. The Ninth Circuit weighed the motives and actions of both parties and found that a determination
in favor of the employee promotes, to the greater degree, the
purposes and policies of the Act.
The Max Factor court appears to be correct in its holding.
It has distinguished Douglas Aircraft in its opinion, thereby effectively limiting an expansion of Douglas in this circuit. 77 In
72. 239 N.L.R.B. at 805.
73. [d.
74. 640 F.2d at 205.
75. [d.
76. [d.
77. This was in spite of the opening made available by the Third Circuit in Pincus.
See note 69 supra.
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addition, it has reinforced the Board's attempt to protect the
employee's rights under the National Labor Relations Act. It did
that, using the standards set by the Board itself under the
Spielberg doctrine. The real problem for the Ninth Circuit in
this area may yet occur, should a change in Board membership
alter those standards once again.
Alice Guckeen
III.

A.

PACIFIC NORTHWEST CHAPTER OF THE
ASSOCIATED BUILDERS AND CONTRACTORS, INC.
u. NLRB: THE NINTH CIRCUIT BROADLY
INTERPRETS SECTION 8(e) OF THE NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS ACT
INTRODUCTION

In Pacific Northwest Chapter of the Associated Builders
and Contractors, Inc. u. NLRB/ the Ninth Circuit enlarged the
scope of the construction industry proviso to section 8(e) of the
National Labor Relations Act by holding, inter alia, that, as a
matter of law, union signatory subcontracting agreements are
protected from secondary boycott proscriptions when obtained
in a collective bargaining context. Rejecting a narrower interpretation of section 8(e), the Ninth Circuit upheld such agreements-even if they embrace job sites at which no members of
the signatory union are employed. 1 The court stressed legislative
history and practical considerations in reaching its result.
The Union Signatory Subcontracting Agreements

The Ninth Circuit consolidated for rehearing before a limited en banc panel two separate orders of the National Labor
Relations Board (the Board).8 The court enforced both orders in
their entirety, reversing the decision of a three-judge panel. 4 The
first order concerned a collective bargaining agreement between
Local 701 of the International Union of Operating Engineers
1. 654 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1981) (per Canby. C.J.), rev'g 609 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir.
1979), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3245 (1981) (No. 80·1808).
2. 654 F.2d at 1320. Union signatory subcontracting agreements prevent a general
contractor from subcontracting work to another employer unless the subcontractor has a
collective bargaining agreement with the signatory union.
3. Id. at 1304.
4. Id. at 1324.
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(the Engineers) and the Oregon-Columbia Chapter of the Associated General Contractors of America, Inc. (AGC), a bargaining
agent representing about 200 construction employers from Oregon and Washington.& The collective bargaining agreement contained a clause prohibiting AGC from contracting "any work
covered by the Agreement to be done at the site of the construction, alteration, painting or repair of a building, structure or
other work to any person, firm or company who does not have an
existing labor agreement with the [Engineers'] Union covering
such work."G A self-help clause allowed either party to "take
such action as they deem necessary"-including strikes and
lockouts-when one party failed to comply with the decision of a
grievance and arbitration proceeding.'
The Pacific Northwest Chapter of the Associated Builders
and Contractors, Inc. complained that the collective bargaining
agreement violated section 8(e) of the National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA).8 The Board disagreed, finding that the questioned
clause fell within the construction industry proviso to section
8(e).8 However, the Board also determined that the self-help
clause violated section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)1° which condemns the use
of economic pressure to enforce such a clause,l1 except in the
5. Id. at 1304.
Id.
7. Id. at 1305.
8. Id. Section 8(e) provides:
6.

It shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor organization and any employer to enter into any contract or agreement, express or implied, whereby such employer ceases or refrains or agrees to cease or refrain from handling, using,
selling, transporting or otherwise dealing in any of the products of another employer, or to cease doing business with any
other person, and any contract or agreement entered into
heretofor or hereafter containing such an agreement shall be
to such extent unenforceable and void: Provided, That nothing in this subsection shall apply to an agreement between a
labor organization and an employer in the construction industry relating to the contracting or subcontracting of !Oork
to be done at the site of the construction, alteration, painting
or repair of a building, structure or other work . ...
29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1976) (emphasis added). A further proviso exempting the apparel
industry from such agreements and from 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B) is omitted.
9. 654 F.2d at 1305.
10. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) (1976).
11. 654 F.2d at 1324.
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apparel industry. 12
The second Board order involved picketing and work stoppages by a union seeking a successor collective bargaining agreement. The union sought a contract provision limiting subcontracting at any construction jobsite to "a person, firm, or
corporation, party to an appropriate, current labor agreement
with the appropriate union, or subordinate body signatory to
this Agreement. "18 When negotiations floundered over this proposed provision,14 Locals 235 and 944 of the United Brotherhood
of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO (Carpenters)
picketed worksites of the employer, Woelke and Romero Framing, Inc. (Woelke).l& Woelke charged the Carpenters with violating sections 8(b)(4)(i) and 8(b)(4)(ii)(A),1· by pressuring the employer "to enter into any agreement which is prohibited by
section 8(e)."17 The Board decided instead that the construction
industry proviso to section 8(e) rather than section 8(b)(4)18 covered the proposed agreement. 18 Again, the Ninth Circuit enforced the Board's order.ao
12. 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1976). See note 8 supra for text of § 158(e).
13. 654 F.2d at 1306.
14. The parties did not agree on 8everal other issues not before the Ninth Circuit.
[d. at 1305 n.3.
15. [d. at 1306.
16. Subsections 158(b)(4)(i) and 158(b)(4)(ii)(A) provide:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization
or its agents(4)(i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed by any person engaged in commerce or in an
industry affecting commerce to engage in, a strike or a refusal
in the course of his employment to use, manufacture, process,
transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles,
materials, or commodities or to perform any services; or (ii) to
threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce
or in an industry affecting commerce, where in either case an
object thereof is(A) forcing or requiring any employer or self-employed person to join any labor or employer organization or to enter into any agreement which is prohibited
by subsection (e) of this section....
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(i) (1976); 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(A) (1976). For the text of §
158(e), see note 8 supra.
17. 654 F.2d at 1306.
18.
19.
20.

[d.
[d.
[d. at 1304.
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Analyzing the AGC agreement and the proposed Woelke
provision, the Ninth Circuit court addressed four issues 21 central
to both subcontracting agreements: (1) whether the subcontracting agreements contravened section 8(e) by being secondary in
nature; (2) whether the construction industry proviso to section
8(e) exempted these clauses from its proscription; (3) whether
picketing or striking to secure agreement to lawful subcontracting clauses violated section 8(b)(4); and (4) whether picketing or
striking to enforce such subcontracting clauses violated section
8(b)(4).
The Ninth Circuit rejected two arguments made by the Engineers, and concluded that these subcontracting clauses reflected secondary purposes.III Having found the union signatory
subcontracting clauses within the scope and proscription of section 8(e), the court then turned to an analysis of the construction industry proviso. lIB After reviewing the legislative history of
section 8(e), and the labor background of the construction industry in general, the court focused on Connell Construction Co.
v. Plumbers Local 100.14 Though Connell is inapposite on several main points, the Ninth Circuit court drew support from it
in holding that union signatory subcontracting clauses are ex21. ld. at 1307. The majority actually addressed at least one other issue. AGC contended that even if § 8(e) allowed subcontracting agreements, it did not permit a "particular-union" subcontracting agreement. ld. at 1323. The Ninth Circuit refused to so limit
the construction industry proviso, noting that nothing in the language of § 8(e) supported such a limitation.
22. The Supreme Court articulated a test for primary and secondary agreements in
National Woodwork Mfn. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612 (1967). Primary agreements,
lawful under § 8(e), are those in which "the agreement or its maintenance is addressed to
the labor relations of the contracting employer vis-a-vis his own employees." ld. at 645.
Secondary agreements, on the other hand, are generally prohibited by § 8(e). A secondary agreement is "tactically calculated to satisfy union objectives elsewhere." ld. at 644.
A popular description of a secondary boycott is that of Judge Learned Hand:
The gravamen of a secondary boycott is that its sanctions
bear, not upon the employer who alone is a party to the dispute, but upon some third party who has no concern in it. Its
aim is to compel him to stop business with the employer in the
hope that this will induce the employer to give in to his employee's demands.
IBEW Local 501 v. NLRB, 181 F.2d 34, 37 (2d Cir.), aff'd, 341 U.S. 694 (1950).
23. 654 F.2d at 1308. See note 8 supra for the text of the proviso. The great weight
of the court's opinion is devoted to this issue. Subsequent discussion of the Ninth Circuit's analysis and the legislative and judicial background of § 8(e) is directed toward the
holding on this matter.
24. 421 U.S. 616 (1975).
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cepted from the coverage of section 8(e) by the construction industry proviso.2&
The Ninth Circuit found the third and fourth issues raised
to be capable of quick disposition. Both elementary statutory
construction and Ninth Circuit and NLRB precedent defeated
Woelke's claim that picketing to coerce acceptance of a subcontracting provision violates section 8(b)(4)(ii)(A).18 However,
picketing or striking to enforce a union signatory subcontracting
agreement is not contemplated by section 8(e).1'7 Thus the selfhelp enforcement clause in the AGC-Engineers agreement is
void absent arbitration or judicial action. ls
B.

A

BRIEF BACKGROUND

The Landrum-Griffin Act: An Inconclusive Legislative History

Secondary pressure and union signatory subcontracting
clauses did not violate the letter of the original National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA).lItI The dramatic rise in unionization, labor union abuses, and the end of World War II contributed to
25. 654 F.2d at 1320.
26. Id. at 1323. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(A) (1976). See note 16 supra for the text
of § 8(b)(4), which prohibits coercion to achieve agreements outlawed in § 8(e). The
Ninth Circuit, having found no § 8(e) violation, could see no violation under §
8(b)(4)(ii)(A). Such agreements need not be reached voluntarily. Construction, Laborers,
Local 383 v. NLRB, 323 F.2d 422 (9th Cir. 1963); Northeastern Ind. Bldg. & Constr.
Council, 148 N.L.R.B. 854 (1964), remanded on other grounds, 352 F.2d 696 (D.C. Cir.
1965).
27. 654 F.2d at 1324. See note 8 supra for the text of § 8{e). The construction
industry proviso, unlike the companion proviso for the apparel industry, does not exempt such agreements (rom the reach of § 8{b)(4)(ii)(B). NLRB V. IBEW, 405 F.2d 159,
163-64 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 921 (1969).
28. 654 F.2d at 1324.
29. Until the TaCt-Hartley Amendments, Labor-Management Relations (TaCtHartley) Act, ch. 120, §§ 1-507, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197
(1976)), CongreBB had effectively exempted labor from secondary boycott liability under
the Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, §§ 1-8, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) {current version at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976)), and the Clayton Act, ch. 323 § 16,38 Stat. 730, 737 (1914) (current
version at 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1976)), except for conduct in furtherance of a conspiracy with
a nonlabor group. Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 421 U.S. 616, 640 (l975);
National Woodwork Mfrs. ASB'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 616, 623 (1967). See AIle!) Bradley
Co. v. IBEW, Local 3, 325 U.S. 797 (l945); United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219
(l94l). Prior to the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70 (1932), unions had no exemption
from antitrust laws for secondary strikes and boycotts. Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters Ass'n, 247 U.S. 37 (1927); Duplex Printing PreBB Co. v. Deering,
254 U.S. 443 (l920). Discussion of the Norris-LaGuardia Act is beyond the scope of this
Note.
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the passage,80 over President Truman's veto, of the Taft-Hartley
Act in 1947.81 The Taft-Hartley Act introduced significant
changes in the NLRA, directed mainly at achieving federal regulation of certain union activities. 82 Congress subdivided section 8
into sections 8(a), which retained the unfair employer labor
practices enumerated in the original NLRA, 8(b), which added
six unfair union labor practices, and 8(c), which introduced a
free speech provision. ss Section 8(b)(4) prohibited an inducement not to handle goods or perform services with the object of
advancing a secondary boycott. 84
Though the terms of section 8(b)(4) seemed to prevent secondary boycotts, Congress perceived that the Board and the
courts had created substantial loopholes. 811 Therefore, Congress
enacted the Landrum-Griffin Act. se In addition to closing other
perceived loopholes in section 8(b),87 Congress attacked a potent
Teamsters Union secondary boycott weapon-the "hot cargo"
clause. 88 Section 8(e) directly foreclosed the use of the "hot
cargo" clause,89 unless the clause satisfied a primary objective,
such as work preservation,·o or came under one of the two
provisos.
The legislative history of the Landrum-Griffin amendments
30. D. WOLLERT & B. AARON, LABOR RELATIONS AND THE LAW 109 (2d ed. 1960).
31. Labor-Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 120, §§ 1-507, 61 Stat.
136 (1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1976».
32. 1 J. JENKINS, LABOR LAW § 2.25 (1968).
33. 61 Stat. 140-2 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)-(c) (1976).
34. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1976).
35. Goldberg & Meiklejohn, Title VII: Taft-Hartley Amendments with Emphasis
on the Legislative History, 54 Nw. U.L. REV. 747, 760 (1960).
36. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act of 1959,
Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 543 (1959) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976».
37. One such closure extended the prohibitions of § 8(b)(4)(A) to any individual.
The original version had used the plural "employees," which as defined by the statute
excluded railway, airline, public employees and supervisors. The plural term meant that
inducements to a single employee could not be reached. NLRB v. International Rice
Milling Co., 341 U.S. 665, 671 (1951).
38. Goldberg & Meiklejohn, supra note 35, at 759. The "hot cargo" clause essentially established a secondary boycott in advance. Under these clauses, signatory employers agreed not to require employees to handle goods from certain other employers, not to
do business with those other employers, or both. A union signatory subcontracting clause
is merely a variant of the "hot cargo" clause. Pacific Northwest Chapter v. NLRB, 654
F.2d 1301, 1310 (9th Cir. 1981).
39. 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1976). The text appears at note 8, supra.
40. National Woodwork Mfrs. v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 620 (1967).
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does not lend great insight into the scope and meaning of section
8(e). Both the Ninth Circuit4 ! and the Supreme Court42 have reviewed this history on several occasions. At least four competing
bills emerged from various congressional committees. 43 In the
House, the Landrum-Griffin bill narrowly defeated a bill reported by the Labor Committee." The Landrum-Griffin bill411
contained the forerunner of the present section 8(e) as support
for the section 8(b) prohibitions against secondary boycotts.48
The Senate version outlawed "hot cargo" agreements only for
the interstate trucking industry.4'7 The Conference Committee
compromise embraced the sweeping prohibition of the House
bill with the addition of provisos excepting the construction and
garment industries. 48
The Connell Decision

In addition to the legislative history, the interpretation
given by the Supreme Court to section 8(e) in Connell49 is central to both the majority and the dissenters in Pacific Northwest. Connell Construction Co. (Connell), a building contractor,
drew picketing from Local 100 because it refused to agree to
subcontract work only to firms with a current contract with the
union. IlO Various other unions represented Connell's employees;
Local 100 never attempted to represent them or bargain on their
behalf. III The union sought the agreement for only one reason-to require subcontractors to recognize it as the representative of their employees. 1I2 The union posted a sole picket at one
of Connell's construction sites, work halted, and Connell signed
41. Pacific Northwest Chapter of the Associated Builders and Contractors, Inc. v.
NLRB, 654 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1981) rev'g 609 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1979); ACCO Constr.
Equip., Inc. v. NLRB, 511 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. 1975).
42. Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975); National
Woodwork Mfrs. Aas'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612 (1967).
43. Goldberg & Meiklejohn, supra note 35, at 759-60.
44. H.R. 8342, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959). Goldberg & Meiklejohn, supra note 35,
at 760.
45. H.R. 8400, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
46. Goldberg & Meiklejohn, supra note 35, at 773.
47. S. 1555, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 707 (1959).
48. 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1976).
49. Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975).
50. Id. at 619.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 631.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1982

39

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [1982], Art. 11

286

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12:279

the subcontracting agreement under protest. liS Connell had
previously filed a state antitrust complaint against Local 100,
and the union removed the action to federal court.1I4 Connell
then amended its complaint to allege federal antitrust violations.
The union defended, claiming the protection of section 8(e).1I1I
The Supreme Court held that the construction industry
proviso of section 8(e) afforded Local 100 no antitrust immunity.1I1I The Court based its decision on three elementS: (1) a reluctance by Congress to permit such unlimited "top-down" organizing; (2) the absence of a collective bargaining agreement;
and (3) the absence of a common jobsite restriction in the subcontracting agreement directed toward limiting friction between
union and nonunion employees. II? Therefore, the Connell subcontracting agreement violated section 8(e) and could be the
foundation of a federal antitrust suit. liB
The Connell Court reasoned that "[o]ne of the major aims
of the 1959 Act was to limit 'top-down' organizing campaigns,"
and buttressed this proposition with the section 8(b) restriction
on primary recognitional picketing and further additions to the
prohibition on secondary boycotts. &8 The Court acknowledged
the garment industry's exemption from section 8(b) and hinted
that Congress felt less need for the use of subcontracting agreements as an organizational weapon in the construction
industry. eo
Because the union had no collective bargaining agreement
with Connell, "[t]he federal policy favoring collective bargaining
... can offer no shelter for the union's coercive action against
Connell or its campaign to exclude nonunion firms from the subcontracting market.""1 Thus, Local 100 became subject to antild. at 620.
ld.
ld. at 621.
ld. at 633.
ld. at 631-33.
58. ld. at 634-35. In summary, the Supreme Court stated: "[W]e think [the proviso's] authorization extends -only to agreements in the context of collective bargaining
relationships and ... possibly to common-situs relationships on particular jobsites as
well." ld. at 633.
59. ld. at 632.
60. ld. at 633 n.13.
61. ld. at 626.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
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trust law as pleaded by Connell. Finally, the union's subcontracting agreement faile:l-in at least two regards-to associate
itself with the labor tranquility rationale for section 8(e). First,
the agreement covered only the work of Local 100 members, but
otherwise did not attempt to regulate subcontracting.s2 Thus,
union members could find themselves working shoulder-toshoulder with nonunion employees. Second, the agreement went
beyond protection of Local 100 members, since it would apply to
jobsites where no Local 100 people worked. ss The Connell Court
believed that to uphold this agreement would create an unlimited organizational weapon. s•

C.

THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S ANALYSIS: POLICY OVER PRECEDENT?

The Majority

The Engineers contended that their subcontracting clause
represented an attempt to preserve work for Local 701 members
within the multi-employer bargaining unit of AGC-a goal
viewed as primary by the Supreme Court in National Woodwork
Manufacturers Association v. NLRBS&-and therefore' not subject to section 8(e).ss The Ninth Circuit rejected this interpretation because, by its language, the clause did not limit subcontracting to members of AGC.s7 More importantly, however, the
Ninth Circuit noted that any work preservation subcontrac~ing
clause which attempts to preserve work for a multi-employer
bargaining unit is inevitably secondary in nature,ss because it
would require one employer to boycott another unless both
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 631.
Id.
Id. Justices Douglas, Stewart, Brennan and Marshall dissented. A brief dissent

by Justice Douglas, who joined Justice Stewart's exhaustive dissent, emphasized his feeling that "the union's conduct is regulated solely by the labor laws." Id. at 638. Justice
Stewart presented a detailed review of legislative history in support of the conclusion
that "Congress did not intend to restore antitrust sanctions for secondary boycott activity such as that engaged in by Local 100 in this case, but rather intended to subject such
activity only to regulation under the National Labor Relations Act and § 303 of the
Labor Management Relations Act." Id. at 654-55. By introducing an antitrust remedy,
the Court altered the balance of power between labor and management that Congress
codified. Id. at 655.
65. 386 U.S. 612 (1967). See note 22 supra. National Woodwork concerned a single
employer; Pacific Northwest involves a multi-employer bargaining group.
66. 654 F.2d at 1307.
67.

68.

Id.
Id. at 1308.
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agreed to the union contract. 88 The Engineers also argued that
one of the goals was preserving work for each contractor's employees and this removed the subcontracting clauses from section 8(e).70 However, mixed objectives do not cure the infirmities
of the clauses, the Ninth Circuit held. 71
The quandary facing the Ninth Circuit in reviewing the legislative background can be stated as: (1) does the background
indicate a congressional intent to allow union signatory subcontracting clauses, and if so, (2) are they meant to be confined to
jobsites where union members are present? The Ninth Circuit
limited en banc majority found two sources persuasive. First the
court cited a Conference Committee statement expressing a desire not to change the then present state of the law "with respect
to the validity of this specific type of agreement relating to work
to be done at the site of the construction project or to remove
the limitations which the present law imposes with respect to
such agreements."n The majority also relied on remarks by Senator Kennedy, the Senate sponsor: "Agreements by which a contractor in the construction industry promises not to subcontract
work on a construction site to a nonunion contractor appear to
be legal today. They will not be unlawful under § 8(e) .... "71
For the Ninth Circuit majority then, section 8(e) did not proscribe union signatory subcontracting clauses per se.
The Ninth Circuit majority then scrutinized the legislative
background to determine if Congress intended union signatory
subcontracting clauses to be valid only at jobsites where union
members worked. Here the majority viewed legislative intent in
light of the contemporaneous decision, Local 1976, United
Brotherhood of Carpenters v. NLRB (Sand Door):7.
The Sand Door decision . . . , which supplied
much of the impetus for § 8(e), had legitimized
secondary boycotts the objectives of which clearly
went beyond the mere avoidance of shoulder-to69. [d. (quoting NLRB v. Joint Council of Teamsters No. 38, 338 F.2d 23, 28 (9th
Cir. 1964)). Accord, NLRB v. National Maritime Union, 486 F.2d 907, 914 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 970 (1973).
70. 654 F.2d at 1308.
71. [d.
72. [d. at 1312.
73. [d.
74. 357 U.S. 93 (1958).
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shoulder friction between workers. It is true that
the construction industry proviso narrowed the
geographical scope of the Sand Door rule by introducing the jobsite limitation, but we do not interpret the words of the proviso as indicating an
intent to narrow the substantive scope of the
Sand Door rule on the jobsite. 70

In support of the conclusion that Congress intended no restriction requiring union members' presence, the Ninth Circuit cited
a 1959 District of Columbia Court of Appeals case" upholding
subcontracting agreements similar to those in Pacific Northwest,
and the testimony of one of the litigants before Congress.""
After elaborating on the legislative and historical background of section 8(e), the Ninth Circuit distinguished Connell.
The employers argued that Connell required the presence of
union members at the jobsite before the disputed subcontracting
agreements couJd apply." The Ninth Circuit majority rejected
that argument as too narrow."e However, it conceded that "the
Connell opinion contains considerable emphasis on problems of
shoulder-to-shoulder friction between union and nonunion workers at the jobsite, and additional emphasis on antagonism of the
1959 Congress to 'top-down' organizing that is one of the effects
of subcontractor agreements."80 After acknowledging the Congressional hostility to "top-down" organizing emphasized in
Connell, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that, within the context of a
collective bargaining agreement, such an organizing weapon is
limited by the employer's ability to assert countervailing demands at the negotiating table. 81
75. 654 F.2d at 1313.
76. Operating Eng'rs Local 3 v. NLRB, 266 F.2d 905 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 361
U.S. 834 (1959).
77. 654 F.2d at 1313 and 1313 n.22. The majority also mentioned a survey suggesting that a number of similar subcontracting agreements existed in 1959 and that
Congress did not intend to alter those arrangements. Id. at 1314. Interestingly, Professor
Cox, adviser to Senator Kennedy on the amendments, has stated that "Congress had no
information about the prevalence or use of similar [hot cargo] clauses in other industries
[than the apparel industry]." Cox, The Landrum-Griffin Amendments to the National
Labor Relations Act, 44 MINN. L. REV. 257, 273-74 (1959).
78. 654 F.2d at 1314.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1321.
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But, at the least, the absence of a collective bargaining
agreement and the resultant antitrust focus of Connell allowed
the Ninth Circuit to infuse additional factors into its decision.
These factors included: (1) conditions of the construction industry, and the various considerations affecting it; (2) limits on
"top-down" organizing imposed by the collective bargaining context; and (3) certain practical matters.
The Ninth Circuit believed that, when pursued in the
course of collective bargaining, union signatory subcontracting
clauses reflect a variety of both primary and secondary interests
beyond jobsite friction.8lI Unlike the union's purely secondary
objective in Connell, Local 701 faced the task of protecting wage
levels and benefits in a situation where "the work force of any
given employer-contractor or subcontractor-is highly flexible
and grows or diminishes or even disappears depending on the
temporary contracting or subcontracting arrangements at any
particular jobsite."88 Through subcontracting, mUltiple employers may hire a few workers for short periods of time, and the
fluidity of such arrangements raises union interests beyond the
avoidance of union-nonunion friction. Because "working conditions applicable to one set of workers may very well affect others
working on the same project,"1W a subcontracting agreement pursued by a union representing employees of the prime contractor
can reflect several primary objectives.
The court maintained that the Connell opinion, particularly
its discussion of section 8(e)'s legislative history, "is sensitive
both to the interconnection of interests between employees of
the various contractors and subcontractors and the broad manner in which any or all of these factors may be exhibited at the
jobsite."811 As authority, the Ninth Circuit quoted extensively
from a Senator's statement-referred to only by way of footnote
citation in Connell-describing the integral nature of construction projects and lack of neutrality among such employers." The
Supreme Court's bare citation attempted to support the contention that section 8(e) may have been intended to overrule a case
82.

83.
84.
85.
86.

[d. at 1317.
[d. at 1316.
[d. at 1317·18.
[d. at 1318.
[d. at 1318·19.
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which prohibited jobsite picketing of a contractor whose nonunion subcontractor was working at the jobsite. 87 The Ninth Circuit found in other sources cited by the Connell opinion similar
references to the community of interests at the jobsite.88
The presence of a collective bargaining agreement8S is critical to the Ninth Circuit's holding that the present provisions
may lawfully extend beyond a single jobsite to other sites where
union members may not even be employed. so The Ninth Circuit
theorized that the collective bargaining context imposes limits
on the "top-down" organizing effect of subcontracting agreements. SI Despite the fact that "[t]here is some 'top-down organizing' effect in any subcontracting agreement, including those
which all parties must admit would be valid and within the proviso,"s2 the Ninth Circuit majority argued that Congress intended to legitimize these effects out of recognition for the community of jobsite interests. ss Because the union in Connell
avoided section 8(b) limits on coercive secondary pressure by its
avowed disinterest in organizing or representing Connell employees, the subcontracting agreement could not be upheld in
light of congressional hostility to "top-down" organizing. 94 But
the Ninth Circuit felt that the unions in Pacific Northwest possessed no such unlimited weapon. If the agreements are sought
87. Id. (citing Connell). The case referred to by the Connell Court is NLRB v.
Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675 (1951). The Supreme Court's statement is curious in light of the Conference Committee report on § 8(e) which stated:
"Restrictions and limitations imposed upon such picketing under present law as interpreted, for example, iii the U.S. Supreme Court decision in the Denver Building Trades
case would remain in full force and effect." 105 CONGo REC. 17,900 (1959), reprinted in
[1959) U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 2512.
88. 654 F.2d at 1319. The Ninth Circuit frequently derived these sources from footnotes in the Connell opinion. See id. n.34, particularly Comment, The Impact of the
Taft-Hartley Act on the Building and Construction Industry, 60 YALE L.J. 673, 684-89
(1951) discussing "numerous other interests that a union representing a primary group of
employees may have in the employment arrangements of other employees at the jobsite."
89. The AGC agreement appeared in their contract with the Engineers. The
Woelke-Carpenters provision entered into negotiations to renew their collective bargaining agreement. 654 F.2d at 1316 n.29. For a discussion of the contract provisions, see text
accompanying notes 5-14 supra.
90. 654 F.2d at 1316. The court further noted a theoretical possibility supporting
such union signatory subcontracting clauses in the absence of a collective bargaining relationship. Id. at 1321 n.37.
91. Id. at 1321.
92. Id. at 1320.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1321.
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during organizational or recognitional picketing, the union is
subject to the strictures of section 8(b).811 If sought by a union
already representing the contractor's employees, the employer
may counter with other demands as part of the negotiating
calculus. Therefore, "the existence of a collective bargaining relationship clearly brings a union signatory subcontracting agreement within the proviso of § 8(e)."" The Ninth Circuit went on
to state that such an agreement may be valid absent a collective
bargaining relationship if the potential for jobsite friction between represented workers and another employer's workers actually exists. 87
Practical considerations also contributed to the Ninth Circuit holding. For example, "[j]obsite by jobsite negotiation of
subcontract agreements would seem burdensome to the point of
impossibility."8s The alternative-permitting the subcontracting
agreements to be triggered when union members appeared.at the
jobsite-poses severe· enforcement problems.8' Such an alternative could also foster anti-union discrimination by employers.
The Dissents

The dissenters emphasized the antitrust and "top-down"
organizing effects of union signatory subcontracting agreements
rather than the special conditions of the construction industry.
Using the Connell opinion as a starting point, the dissenters
condemned the majority holding for three reasons. First, a signa95. Id.
96. Id. (emphasis in original).
97. Id. n.37. This hypothetical possibility is based on the Connell opinion's language quoted at note 75 supra.
98. Id. at 1322. This practical concern is strongly reflected in § 8(f), which authorizes "pre-hire" agreements. Construction industry unions may represent and obtain collective bargaining agreements for workers not yet hired and before the majority status of
the union has been determined. 29 U.S.C. § 158(f) (1976). The District of Columbia Circuit, in an important decision, has held that § 8(f) agreements are sufficient to trigger §
8(e) protection for union signatory subcontracting clauses. Donald Shriver, Inc. v.
NLRB, 635 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Thus a construction union representing workers
under either § 9(a) (exclusive bargaining representative elected by a majority of a proper
unit) or § 8(f) satisfies the collective bargaining context required by Connell, at least in
the District of Columbia Circuit.
99. 654 F.2d at 1322. The limited en banc majority emphasized "the difficulty of
defining the applicable time span during which jobsite conflict is threatened" and the
temporary quality of employment arrangements at construction jobsites. Id. Responding
to the dissenters, the majority reasoned that compliance with subcontracting agreements
is easier to monitor than the presence of a union worker at any particular time. Id. n.38.
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tory employer sacrifices the "right to choose the more efficient
subcontractor. Preservation of this opportunity would be more
consistent with the primary concern of Connell than is the position of the en banc court. "100 Even a more efficient nonsignatory
subcontracting firm that adheres to union standards of wages
and conditions is foreclosed from the jobsite. lol Second, the dissenters stated that Connell-and pre-Connell Ninth Circuit investigations into the legislative history of section 8(e)10I-found
jobsite friction to be the main congressional concern. loa Therefore, the extension of subcontracting agreements to jobsites
where the signatory union had no members employed flouted
congressional intent. Finally, the majority holding's assertion
that Congress intended to preserve construction industry collective bargaining patterns as they existed in 1959 contained fallacies. The proviso partially overruled the Sand DoorlOf case of
1958 and "[f]urthermore, the lawfulness and permissible scope
of subcontractor agreements had not been conclusively determined in 1959."1011 The dissenters also suggested that the unions
could obtain comparable results by a primary m'ethod-the
union standards clause. lOCI
The dissenters l07 claimed that Congress mainly intended to
alleviate jobsite friction, thereby limiting subcontracting agreements to jobsites with union members present. lOS The dissenters
were swayed by pervasive references in the legislative record to
the proximity of union and nonunion workers as well as by a
100. 1d. at 1326. (Sneed, J., dissenting). Judge Farris, author of the other dissenting opinion voiced a similar criticism: "In Connell ... , the Supreme Court concluded
that the construction industry proviso did not authorize a construction industry employer and a union not representing its employees to agree to limit the employer's right
to subcontract." 1d. at 1327 (citations omitted).
101. 1d. at 1325 (Sneed, J., dissenting).
102. Pacific Northwest Chapter of the Associated Builders and Contractors, Inc. v.
NLRB, 609 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 654 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1981); ACCO Constr.
Equip., Inc. v. NLRB, 511 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. 1975).
103. 654 F.2d at 1326.
104. Local 1976, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 93 (1958).
105. 654 F.2d at 1327.
106. 1d.
107. Though two dissents appeared in Pacific Northwest, the author of one, Judge
Farris, joined Judge Sneed's dissent "in all respects" and merely added "some comments
regarding the scope of the construction industry proviso." 1d. Therefore, this Note treats
the two dissents 88 one.
108. 1d. at 1326.
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previous Ninth Circuit opinion1oe by a dissenter in Pacific
Northwestern that surveyed the legislative history of section
8(e). In that earlier opinion, ACCD Construction Equipment,
Inc. v. NLRB, the Ninth Circuit panel focused on the peculiar
nature of the construction industry, which involves a variety of
crafts, and numerous subcontractors working continuously
alongside one another, as the source of congressional concern. no
The Ninth Circuit dissenters also relied on legislative comment to the effect that section 8(e) addressed the jobsite handling of materials fabricated by nonunion members. 11l The author of the overturned three-judge panel decision had pointedly
stated: U[T]he broad assertion that the construction industry
proviso was designed. to leave the law unchanged is inaccurate."111 The opinion further maintained that union signatory
subcontracting clauses had not been adjudged lawful at the time
of the proviso's passage. ua In the three-judge panel's estimation,
at least two changes occurred as a result of the interaction between Sand Doorll4 and the proviso. First, Congress added a
jobsite restriction, an element not addressed in Sand Door.
Second, Congress stated that the proviso did not protect agreements concerning jobsite handling of non-union materials,
whereas Sand Door had found such agreements lawful.l I•

n.

109. ACCO Constr. Equip., Inc. v. NLRB, 511 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. 1975) (per Choy,
C.J.).
110. Id. at 851. Judge Sneed's excerpt from ACCO appeara at 609 F.2d at 1349.
Soon after the events surrounding the enactment of § 8(e), Professor Cox remarked:
The fact that CODgreBB rejected the attacka upon the sec·
ondary boycott provisions of the Landrum·Griffin bill which
alleged that the bill unwisely threw doubt upon the validity of
bona fide restrictions upon subcontracting, may be attributed
to disbelief in the allegation just as easily as to congreBBional
opposition to contractual restrictions upon managerial free·
dom to subcontract, although there are undoubtedly individu·
als who hoped also to resolve the Bubcontracting issue in favor
of management.
Cox, supra note 77, at 273. See also Goldberg & Meiklejohn, supra note 35, at 771-72.
111. 654 F.2d at 1326.
112. Pacific Northwest Chapter v. NLRB, 609 F.2d 1341, 1349 (9th Cir. 1979). The
opinion is by Judge Sneed, who diBBented from the limited en banc decision.

113. Id.
114. Local 1976, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB (Sand Door), 357 U.S. 93
(1958).
115. 609 F.2d at 1349.
116. rd.
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TAMED

National labor policy considerations and the historical context underlying section 8(e) mandated the Ninth Circuit's reversal of the three-judge panel. Though the Connell opinion stated
that, with the enactment of section 8(e), Congress did not intend
to preserve a pattern of bargaining practices,11'7 the question of
what manner of union signatory subcontracting clauses are lawful remained unanswered. With Pacific Northwest, the Ninth
Circuit fashioned a reasonable accommodation between the concerns outlined in Connell and congressional recognition of the
unique conditions of the construction industry. The LandrumGriffin Act reflects congressional concessions to the construction
industry beyond the labor tranquility rationale, acknowledging
economic realities at construction jobsites.
Unlike the purely secondary goals of the union in Connell,
these subcontracting agreements seek to standardize working
conditions of a signatory contractor's employees. us By recognizing this primary union concern, the Ninth Circuit joins the District of Columbia and Third Circuits.ll9 The overturned threejudge panel opinion failed due to its singular preoccupation with
jobsite friction and "top-down" organizing, overlooking legislative concern for construction industry unions. lao The limited en
117. 421 U.S. at 628.
118. See text accompanying notes 93-99 supra.
119. Donald Shriver, Inc. v. NLRB, 635 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Larry V. Muko,
Inc. v. Southwestern Pa. Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 609 F.2d 1368 (3d Cir. 1979).
The holding in Donald Shriver firmly supports the Ninth Circuit decision. Cited frequently in Pacific Northwest, it contains a forceful exposition of analysis similar to the
Ninth Circuit's. The District of Columbia Circuit held: (1) a § 8(0 prehire agreement is a
sufficient collective bargaining relationship to invoke the construction industry proviso,
635 F.2d at 875; (2) union signatory subcontracting provisions may extend to jobsites
where union members are not present, id. at 881; and, (3) such provisions may designate
particular unions, id. at 885. The Donald Shriver court, as did the Ninth Circuit, recog·
nized the primary union goal of standardized working conditions in addition to the
avoidance of common jobsite labor friction. Id. at 873. For a comparison of Donald
Shriver and the overturned panel opinion in Pacific Northwest, see Note, Hot Cargo
Agreements in the Construction Industry: Restraints on Subcontracting Under the Proviso to Section 8(e), 1981 DUKE L.J. 141 (1981).
120. See Note, Hot Cargo Contracts in the Construction Industry: Pacific North·
west Chapter, Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. NLRB, 17 WILLAMETTE L. RBv.
741 (1981) (describing the opinion as "strained").
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banc opinion defines limits to "top-down" organizing while adequately providing for the community of interests displayed at
the jobsite.
Tom C. Clark

IV. THE PICKET AND THE PROPERTY OWNER
A.

INTRODUCTION

In Seattle-First National Bank v. NLRB,1 the Ninth Circuit held that a union may picket on private property in order to
effectively communicate its message in support of an economic
strike! Since economic strike activity is central to section 7
rights under the National Labor Relations Act (the Act),1 picketing related to that activity is restricted less than is organizational or area standards picketing. Consequently, this court
would not hold a union involved in economic activity picketing
to the same high burden of proof applicable to other picketing
activities.· However, even though a union may picket on private
property, the property owner's rights must be protected by
properly restricting the number of pickets and their conduct.'

B.

FACTS

Seattle-First National Bank (the Bank) owns a fifty-story
office building in Seattle, Washington. The Bank occupies approximately one-third of the building, and leases the remainder
to commercial, professional and retail-trade tenants. During
1978, the Mirabeau Restaurant (the Restaurant) leased space on
1. 651 F.2d 1272 (9th Cir. 1980) (per Sneed, J.; the other panel members were
Fletcher, J. and Jameson, D.J., sitting by designation).
. 2. Id. at 1275.
3. Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act reads in part: "Employees shall
have the right to self-organization, to form, join or assist labor organizations, to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection . . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
4. 651 F.2d at 1276. For organizational or area standards picketing unions must
prove that no other reasonable means of communication exists. Id. An economic strike,
such as that engaged in here, is defined as "a work stoppage ... , typically in support of
bargaining demands regarding wages and working conditions . . . ." R. GORHAM, BASIC
TEXT ON LABOR LAW, UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, 339 (1976).
5. 651 F.2d at 1277.
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the forty-sixth floor of the building, along with a stock brokerage
firm. The Bank retained exclusive control of the foyer on that
floor which was open to the pUblic. The foyer, in addition to providing access to the businesses located on that floor, was used by
persons changing elevators to continue to the forty-seventh floor
and above. s
In April 1978, the Restaurant began negotiations with the
Hotel, Motel, Restaurant Employees and Bartenders'Union Local 8, AFL-CIO (the Union) for a new collective-bargaining
agreement. On July 14, two days after discontinuing negotiations, and after having failed to reach a new agreement, the
Union began an economic strike against the Restaurant. 7
The Union stationed pickets, who carried placards and distributed leaflets and information to the public, at all entrances
to the building. In addition, the union assigned one or two persons to distribute leaflets in front of the Restaurant in the fortysixth floor foyer during lunch and dinner hours.8
On the first day of the strike, the Bank demanded that the
pickets leave the foyer and threatened them with arrest for trespass. The pickets refused to leave and the Bank sought an injunction in state court barring access to the forty-sixth floor.
The state court stayed its proceedings, holding that its jurisdiction had been pre-empted when the Union filed unfair labor
practice charges against the Bank with the National Labor Relations Board (the NLRB).'
Based on the Union's charge, the NLRB General Counsel
issued a complaint against the Bank on August 25, 1978. The
6. Id. at 1273.
7. Although the Restaurant was the primary employer, it was not a party to this
dispute. The Bank entered this action as the property owner, but was also recognized by
the NLRB as an employer under the Act.ld. n.2. The Bank also had an interest in the
outcome of the original conflict between the Restaurant and the Union because the rent
paid by the Restaurant was based on a percentage of monthly gross sales. Consequently,
the Bank lost rental income during the strike. Brief for Respondent at 7 n.4.
8. Seattle-First Nat'l Bank, 243 N.L.R.B. 898 (1979).
9. 651 F.2d at 1273. Since the Union did not file an unfair labor practice charge
until after the Bank sought injunctive relief in state court, the state court may not have
been pre-empted from proceeding. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180
(1980). However, since this issue was not under review in this case, the court offered no
opinion.
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complaint alleged unfair labor practices under section 8(a)(1) of
the Act,IO based solely on the Bank's threat to arrest the pickets
on the forty-sixth floor of its building. l1
A three-member panel of the NLRB considered the issuesl l
and found in favor of the Union, holding that the Bank's threat
of arrest violated section 8(a)(1) of the Act.1lI The NLRB found
that the Bank's property rights must yield to the Union's section
7 rights and that the Union had the right to issue leaflets and
discuss its dispute with the public in the foyer of the forty-sixth
floor of the Bank's building.
The NLRB ordered the Bank to allow the picketing to continue and to post in the foyer a notice of intent not to interfere
with those strike activities. U The Bank petitioned the circuit
court of appeals for review of the NLRB's order; the NLRB concurrently filed for enforcement. III

c.

BACKGROUND

The activity of pickets on private property has exposed the
conflict between the picketer's right to engage in protected activity as defined by the Actle and the property owner's right to
the free and unencumbered use and enjoyment of his property}'
However, when that property owner has used his property in a
public manner, transforming it into "quasi-public" property, labor activists have argued, and the courts have agreed, that the
10. Section 8(a)(1) provides in part: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-(l) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section 157 of this title .... " 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1)(1976).
11. 651 F.2d at 1274.
12. Both parties stipulated to the facts, waived a hearing before an Administrative
Law Judge, and waived all oral testimony. The proceedings were transfered directly to
the NLRB, where they were reviewed by Chairman Fanning, and Board members Jenkins and Murphy. 243 N.L.R.B. at 898.
13. rd. at 899.
14. rd. at 900.
15. 651 F.2d at 1274.
16. For the activities defined in the Act as being protected, see note 3 supra.
17. In contrast, the right to picket on public property has been the subject of extensive litigation and has evolved from a constitutionally protected right based on the first
and fourteenth amendments, Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940), to a statutorily
regulated and protected activity under the Act. Picketing on public property is also generally considered immune from state regulation by virtue of federal preemption. See note
9 supra. For a further discussion of the judicial review of picketing, see R. GORMAN,
supra note 4, at 211-13.
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property owner has relinquished his right to sole control of that
property.18
Using precedent established in cases related to soliciting as
well as to picketing, employees originally relied on first amendment principles to protect their right to picket on private property.11 A balancing approach emerged in NLRB v. Babcock &
Wilcox, CO.IO Although decided a quarter of a century ago, Babcock & Wilcox still controls conflicts arising from union activities on private property. In Babcock & Wilcox, non-employee
union organizers attempted to distribute leaflets in a companyowned parking lot. The Court held that because both property
rights and employees' organizational rights are protected, bOth
must be accommodated. But, in the final analysis, the property
owner's right to exclude must yield to the employees' rights,
should no other reasonable alternative exist.1I
18. "Ownership does not always mean absolute dominion. The more an owner, for
his advantage, opens up his property for use by the public in general, the more do his
rights become circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of those who use
it." Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506 (1946) (Black, J.).
19. In Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946), the Supreme Court extended 6nt
amendment protection to a religious leatleter in a company town which had all the characteristics of any other town and was indistinguishable from public property. In AmaJagated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968), the Court
found the "functional equivalent of the business district in Marsh" in a shopping center.
Id. at 318. Consequently, first amendment protection was extended to labor unions pick-'
eting there.
The first amendment protection began to shrink, however, in Lloyd v. Tanner, f.fY1
U.S. 551 (1972):The Lloyd Court distinguished Logan Valley on the facts, claiming that
the picketing in Logan Valley was protected by the first amendment because the activity
of the pickets was related to the center's operation. The activity of the anti-war leatleten
in Lloyd was totally unrelated to that center's operation; no first amendment protection
was applicable. The Court also held that Lloyd Center's open-to-the-public policy did
not destroy the private character of the center or equate it to a municipal business district. Id. at 569. In Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 538 (1972), announced the
same day as Lloyd, the Court again questioned the "functional equivalent" test of Mania
and Logan Valley. The Court held that, unlike shopping centers, single unit stores could
not be described as a community business block. Firat amendment principles do DOt
apply to this case because the property did not "assume, to some significant degree, the
functional attributes of public property devoted to public use." Id. at 547. The issues in
Central Hardware must be resolved as directed by § 7 of the Act. .
20. 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
21.
Organizational rights are granted to workers by the same authority, the National Government, that preserves property
rights. Accommodation between the two must be obtained
with as little destruction of one as is consistent with the maintenance of the other . . . . The right to exclude from property
has been required to yield to the extent needed to permit com-
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The accommodation requirement of Babcock & Wilcox was
quoted with favor by the Court in Hudgens v. NLRB.II In Hudgens, striking warehouse employees of the Butler Shoe Company
began to picket the company's retail outlets. One store was located within the North DeKalb Shopping Center, in Atlanta,
Georgia, a shopping center containing sixty stores housed in one
large building with an enclosed mall. Since the shoe store could
only be entered from the mall, the pickets stationed themselves
outside the store, but inside the mall. They left after being
threatened with arrest, and the union filed unfair labor practice
charges against the shopping center.1I
With Hudgens, the Supreme court eliminated the claim of
first amendment protection for picketing, remanded to the
NLRB for consideration under sections 7 and 8(a)(l) of the Act,
and directed that the accommodation required by Babcock &
Wilcox be applied."
D.

HOLDING OF THE COURT

The Ninth Circuit in Seattle-First National Bank v. NLRB
relied on the Supreme Court decision in Hudgens and its instruction that the NLRB must apply the standards of the Act to
the facts of cases of this genre and not rely on first amendment
principles.1II Additionally, the rights guaranteed the union under
the Act, when in conflict with the rights of the property owner,
must be resolved under the Babcock & Wilcox standard."
The significant fact situation found by the NLRB in its review of Hudgens on remand was also found by the Ninth Circuit
in Seattle-First National Bank. In both cases, it was asserted
that the picketers were only able to identify their intended audience at the time the public actually entered the specific business
munication on the right to organize.
ld. at 112.
22. 424 U.S. 507, 521 (1976).
23. ld. at 509-10.
24. ld. at 522. The Court also concluded that Lloyd v. Tanner had overruled Logan
Valley. See note 19 supra. The Court stated that "under the present state of the law the
constitutional guarantee of free expression has no part to play in a case such as this.
424 U.S. at 521.
25. 651 F.2d at 1274.
26. ld. at 1276. For a discUSBion of the Babcock & Wilcox standard, see note 21
supra and accompanying text.

II
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being picketed, not at the time potential customers entered the
mall (Hudgens) or the bank building (Seattle-First National
Bank).2? Picketing on the street outside the bank building, while
informing all persons entering the building of the labor dispute
with the Restaurant, did not adequately reach those persons
who, after having been in the building on other business, decided to eat at the Restaurant. The court noted this was particularly true of workers in the building who entered the premises
early in the day, and had forgotten the pickets' message by the
lunch hour. The court concluded that to deny pickets access to
the forty-sixth floor foyer substantially damaged their rights
under section 7 since this location was the only effective site (or
the union to convey its message to its intended audience."
The court noted that the Bank had opened the foyer to the
public as part of its invitation to patronize the Restaurant. In
addition, there was no evidence that the presence of the pickets
on the forty-sixth floor had been intrusive in any way or had
denied the public or other tenants their expected use of this
property. Therefore, the property rights of the Bank had to
yield to accommodate the free exercise of the union's section 7
rights."
The court was also swayed by the finding that the union was
picketing in support of an economic strike.so The court recognized that organizational and area standards picketing are subject to greater restrictions,81 but that since U[t]he right to picket
27. Scott Hudgens and Local 315, 230 N.L.R.B. 414, 416 (1977); Seattle-First Nat'}
Bank v. NLRB, 651 F.2d at 1275.
28. 651 F.2d at 1275·76.
29. All evidence indicated that the pickets on the forty-sixth floor had been miDimally intrusive. The Union had stationed no more than two pickets in the area at a time.
They had not carried banners or placards, but had distributed handbills which they also
held in front of themselves to form a picket line. Id. at 1277.
30. Id. at 1273.
31. Section 8(b)(7) of the Act restricts certain types of organizational picketing. 29
U.S.C. § 158(b)(7) (1976). Organizational picketing involves non-employees 88 weD 88
employees. In addition, the audience toward whom organizational picketing is directed
(the employees of the targeted company) is different from that of an economic picket
line (the customers and the employees of the targeted company). For a discussion of the
distinction between organizational and economic picketing and the intended audience,
see Scott Hudgens, 230 N.L.R.B. 414, 416 (1977). See also Note, Focusing on Labor
Pickets' Rights In Shopping Centers With A Section 7 Lens~Scott Hudgens, 27 D.
PAUL L. REV. 1287 (1978). Area standards picketing is conducted by non-employees and
is directed at employees and customers. For a recent examination of area standard pick-
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in support of an economic strike is at the core of section 7,"11 a
greater accommodation of the property owner's rights would
have to be made.
The court did agree with the Bank that the foyer of the
forty-sixth Boor could not be properly compared to a shopping
center mall, like the one in Hudgens." The NLRB's order as
issued was judged too broadly written to properly protect Bank
property from damage or unnecessary abuse." Consequently,
the court remanded to the NLRB in order to place appropriate
limits on the union's activity within the Bank's building."
E.

CRITIQUE

In Seattle-First National Bank, the Ninth Circuit has supported the NLRB in expanding the application of section 7
rights available to labor organizations by allowing picketing
within an office building. This is a logical response to the socioeconomic trends which have produced shopping centers, industrial parks and multi-tenant, high-rise office buildings. Indeed,
the Board has no choice but to insist that those persons whose
employment is located in leased space on private property be
granted the same rights as those whose employer is the owner
and single occupant of a free-standing building. To do otherwise
would "render section 7 meaningleBB."N
The ramifications of this development, however, could create some unpleasant problems for private property owners who
until now have not faced these situations. For example, the long
standing practice of the NLRB has been that pickets may not
demonstrate within a store.·7 However, modern retailers, in
many cases, stand in shoes similar to those of shopping center
developers or office building owners since they are not always
the primary employers of persons working in their buildings. It
eting, see Giant Foot Mkts. v. NLRB, 633 F.2d 18 (6th Cir. 1981).
32. 651 F.2d at 1276.
33. "The mall in Hudgens was apparently quite long .... The foyer is both smaller
and normally quieter." ld. at 1277.
34.Id.
35.Id.
36. Scott Hudgens, 230 N.L.R.B. at 418.
37. Marshall Field & Co. v. NLRB, 200 F.2d 375 (1953). See also Bonwit Teller,
Inc., 96 N.L.R.B. 608 (1951); J.L. Hudson Co., 67 N.L.R.B. 1403 (1946); May Dep't
Stores Co., 59 N.L.R.B. 976 (1944).
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is not unusual for department store owners, who attempt to
reach a wide variety of customers, to distribute some of their
operation, such as beauty salons or restaurants, to specialists
who provide these unique services which the store is unable or
unwilling to undertake. These leased departments rent space
within the landlord store, often on a rate determined as a percent of sales. 88 The lessee or tenant benefits by sharing in the
customer traffic provided by the landlord store, as well as various other services, which may include security, utilities, credit
service and sales promotion. The landlord store benefits from
the direct rental income and from the additional services offered
by the tenant which enhances the landlord's customer relations.
In this situation, the landlord store is not the employer of
the lessee's employees. The lessee pays its employees directly,
provides all benefits and negotiations with any unions involved
in its operation. However, if the lessee is unable to bargain satisfactorily with its employees' representatives, then based on Seattle-First National Bank, the store can expect pickets to patrol
both the exterior and interior public areas of its building." If
the tenant is renting space in the basement of the store for use
as a restaurant, the union representing its employees could station pickets outside the entrance to the restaurant, in the landlord's basement. Should the landlord object, and threaten the
pickets with arrest for trespass, the union can file an unfair labor practice charge against the landlord and, as in Seattle-First
National Bank, the state courts are likely to dismiss the issue on
the basis of federal pre-emption.40 The store could find itself in
an unpleasant labor relations conflict even though it may have
been very successful in negotiating with the union representing
its own employees.
The store might argue that it is unjustified to treat one
small department within its building as one would treat an independent store within a shopping center. In addition, one cannot
compare the basement of a department store with the mall or a
modern shopping center. This argument had some impact on the
38. Such an agreement existed between the Bank and the Restaurant in SeattleFirst National Bank. See Brief for Respondent at 7, n.4.
39. See notes 28 and 29 supra and accompanying text.
40. See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
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court in Seattle-First National Bank. 41
The Ninth Circuit recognized the differences between the
Bank's forty-sixth floor foyer and a shopping center mall; consequently, it instructed the NLRB to limit its order to the Bank
accordingly." The court noted that the Union had not damaged
the Bank's property or disturbed other businesses in the building and in fact had acted with moderation and restraint. However, the court insisted that the NLRB set proper limits on
union activity. The court's warning is clear: It will enforce the
NLRB's orders when the NLRB finds that section 7 rights have
been infringed upon by employers. However, at the same time,
the NLRB must make the necessary accommodation to the private property owner's rights as required by Babcock & Wilcox
and Hudgens. That accommodation cannot be assumed, but
must be specincallyexpressed in the NLRB's order as to the
number of pickets acceptable and the range of activity allowed.4I
This is the one safeguard that the property owner can rely
upon. His building, be it shopping center, office building or department store, can be invaded by union activists who can picket under his own roof. The NLRB must limit that union activity
to the extent necessary to prevent property loss or damage.
F.

CONCLUSION

High-rise, and multi-tenant office buildings, like shopping
centers, are modem developments which encouraged employers
to band together in lease agreements for mutual convenience
and profit. The Ninth Circuit has held that employees' rights
under the National Labor Relations Act may not be circumvented by a lessor-employer's reliance on a third-party owner's
private property interests."
The Ninth Circuit has extended the employees' right to
picket to the interior of the building in which the employer has
leased space, and is willing to allow that activity forty-six floors
41. 651 F.2d at 1277. See comparison made by the court in note 33 supra.
42. 651 F.2d at 1277.
43. It was on this issue that Judge Fletcher based his dissent, claiming that the
court's restriction here, absent any evidence of illegal picketing, is outside the court's
jurisdiction. [d. at 1278.
44. ld. at 1276.
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above the street. This activity is justified to enable the union to
reach its intended audience on the employers' actual doorstep.
The court insists, however, that the NLRB, while protecting the
employees' rights, also accomodate the property owner's rights
to the fullest extent necessary. fit
Alice Guckeen

V. OTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN LABOR LAW
In other significant decisions last term, the court devised
new "willfulness" tests for two statutes, expressed a rather expansive view of federal statutory jurisdiction and adopted a per
se rule regarding employer requests for employee statements
given in conjunction with unfair labor practice investigations.
A.

WILLFULNESS STANDARD

In Marshall v. Union Pacific Motor Freight Co., 1 the court
in a per curiam opinion adopted a willfulness standard for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act. As a consequence, neither
a good faith belief by the employer in the lawfulness of the employer's wage and overtime policies nor complete ignorance of
the Act's provisions will shield the employer with immunity. In
Kelly v. American Standard, Inc.,' the court required only a
knowing and voluntary violation to find willfulness under the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act.
1. Marshall v. Union Pacific Motor Freight Co.

In Union Pacific, the Secretary. of Labor sought to enjoin
the Union Pacific Motor Freight Company (the Company) from
failing to pay past and future overtime compensation to its dispatchers. The Secretary contended that the Company's failure
to pay overtime violated section 7 of the Fair Labor Standards
Act (FLSA),' and that the violation was willful, so that the
45. ld. at 1277.

1. 650 F.2d 1085 (9th Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
2. 640 F.2d 974 (9th Cir. 1981) (per Boochever, J.).
3. Section 7 of the Act provides that:
Except as otherwise provided in this section, no employer
shall employ any of his employees ... for a workweek longer
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three-year rather than the two-year statute of limitations applied.· The Company countered that its dispatchers were exempt from the overtime provisions of the FLSA because their
duties "affect the safety of operations of vehicles used in interstate commerce" and were, therefore, regulated by the Secretary
of Transportation. 1I
The district court accepted the Company's arguments, finding that the dispatchers were exempt from the FLSA overtime
provisions, and, alternatively, that the Company's failure to pay
was not "willful." The Ninth Circuit reversed on both grounds.
No exemption

The Company operates as a motor carrier in interstate commerce and handles freight which moves in part by rail. The dispatchers perform both inside and outside duties. The job of
outside dispatcher was created to control unsafe and congested
conditions in the terminal. Dispatchers also are responsible in
part for implementing federal regulations on the transportation
of hazardous materials and ensuring that containers and vehicles
transporting hazardous materials are properly placarded. Based
on these limited dispatcher duties, the Company contended that
it, as an employer, was exempt from the FLSA's overtime regulations,6 because implementing regulations "necessarily involves
the performance of duties that directly affect safety of operation.'" The panel rejected that argument because of a longstanding determination by the Interstate Commerce Commission that the primary duties of dispatchers do not bring them
within the exemption. 8 The court explained that, were the comthan forty hours, unless such employee receives compensation
for his employment in excess of the hours above specified at a
rate not le88 than one and one·half times the regular rate at
which he is employed.
29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (1976).
4. Id. § 255(a).
5. 650 F.2d at 1087. The Secretary's authority is found in 49 U.S.C. § 304 (1976).
6. The jurisdiction of the Secretary of Transportation under the Motor Carriers Act
extends only to "those employees [of common carriers) whose activities affect the safety
of operation." 650 F.2d at 1089 (quoting United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns,
Inc., 310 U.S. 534, 553 (1940) (emphasis added)).
7. 650 F.2d at 1090.
8. The Commission applies a proximate cause test. While judgments in error by dispatchers may be contributing factors to subsequent accidents, they are never the proximate cause of the accidents. 650 F.2d at 1090 n.9.
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pany's view accepted, any employer could be exempted from the
overtime provisions of the FLSA simply by dividing among his
employees those safety inspection and enforcement duties imposed by governmental regulations.
Willfulness

Under the FLSA, an action for overtime pay must be
brought within two years of the time the cause of action accrues-unless the violation is "willful";' a willful action may be
commenced within three years. 10 The Ninth Circuit had not previously adopted a standard for determining whether violations
of the Act are willful. The court expanded the views taken by
the District of Columbiall and Fifthl l Circuits. Both those circuits hold that an employer is not relieved of its obligation to
comply with the FLSA merely because of the employer's own
error. 18 The Fifth Circuit holds further that reliance on the advice of counsel is no shield. 14 The Ninth Circuit standard is
somewhat stricter. In this circuit,
[a] violation is willful when the employer was, or
should have been, cognizant of an appreciable
possibility that the employees involved were covered by the statutory provisions. Reliance on erroneous advice is no bar to a finding of a "willful"
violation, except for good faith reliance upon ad9. 29 U.S.C. § 255(a) (1976).
10.ld.
11. In the District of Columbia Circuit, noncompliance is willful when the employer
"is cognizant of an appreciable possibility that he may be subject to the statutory requirements and fails to take steps reasonably calculated to resolve the doubt ... [or]
when an equally aware employer consciously and voluntarily charts a course which turns
out to be wrong." Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429, 462 (D.C. Cir. 1976),
quoted in Marshall v. Union Pac. Motor Freight Co., 650 F.2d at 1092.
.
12. The Fifth Circuit test is similar: "[A]n employer acts willfully and subjects himself to the three-year liability provision if he knows or has reason to know, that his conduct is governed by the Fair Labor Standards Act." Brennan v. Heard, 491 F.2d I, 3 (5th
Cir. 1974) (emphasis in original), quoted in Marshall v. Union Pac. Motor Freight Co.,
650 F.2d at 1092.
13. In Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429 (D.C. Cir. 1976), the employer
was familiar with the statutory provisions but erroneously concluded that they did not
apply. See 650 F.2d at 1092. In Brennan v. Heard, 491 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1974), the employer had reason to suspect the statute applied to him. The employer's unwillingness to
determine the statutory obligation did not protect him from the extra year of liability.
See Marshall v. Union Pac. Motor Freight Co., 650 F.2d at 1092.
14. Coleman v. Jiffy June Farms, Inc., 458 F.2d 1139, 1141-42 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 948 (1972).
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vice rendered by an appropriate government
agency.u

The court has put employers on notice that neither the employer's own error, its assertion of ignorance of the Act's requirements, nor reliance on the advice of counsel will shield the employer from a finding of willfulness. Good faith reliance on the
erroneous advice of an appropriate government agency, however,
would not make a violation willful.
The opinion seems correct. The three-year statute of limitations of the FLSA serves to prevent an employer from forestalling a lawsuit by misleading its employees of rights available
under the FLSA. Accordingly, neither ignorance, erroneous interpretation, nor reliance on the advice of its own counsel should
be a bar when the employer has reason to mislead the employee.

2. Kelley u. American Standard, Inc.
In Kelly u. American Standard. Inc., Ie the Ninth Circuit
adopted a somewhat different willfulness standard for violations
of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)17 and remanded to the district court for redetermination of the willfulness of the employer's actions.
Kelly, the employee, was a territorial sales representative
for defendant-employer American Standard, Incorporated of Seattle from 1954 to 1975. American reduced its sales force by
forty employees in 1975, including one employee in the Seattle
district. Kelly was the Seattle employee terminated. Plaintiff,
fifty-seven years old, contended he was discharged because of his
age-an allegation the employer denied.
The case was tried to a jury which found in favor of Kelly
and awarded $48,500 in damages. The court then awarded
$14,000 attorneys fees but denied Kelly'S request for liquidated
damages under the ADEA, finding that American had not acted
"willfully,"18 and that the "good faith" defensel t under ADEA
15. Marshall v. Union Pac. Motor Freight Co., 650 F.2d at 1092-93.
16. 640 F.2d 974 (9th Cir. 1981) (per Boochever, J.).
17. Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (1967) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976».
18. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976). Section 626(b) limite liquidated damages to willful
violations.
19. [d. § 260.
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applied.
The willfulness test adopted by the Ninth Circuit for discrimination requires only a knowing and voluntary violation of
the Act to entitle the plaintiff to liquidated damages. lo The
panel rejected the test employed by the district court which required specific intent and knowledge of ADEA implications. The
court reasoned that to require knowledge of implications under
the Act could have the anomalous effect of encouraging employers to know as little as possible about the ADEA so that they
would not be liable for liquidated damages.
The defendaIit objected to the adoption of the lower standard, and argued that such an approach would make liquidated
damages automatic. II In a footnote, the panel declined to extend
the provisions of double damages to reckless violations, an approach urged by the Third Circuit.I I The panel then dismissed
the defendant's argument on the grounds that an employer's act
could violate the ADEA, without being knowing and voluntary.1I
However, defendant's contention remains unanswered. For example, a plaintiff need not present evidence of the defendant's
state of mind to establish a basis for liability.l. Statistical evidence can be used to establish a prima facie case, and, in fact, is
often the only evidence available to a discharged employee.1I
Statistical evidence can now also be used to establish willfulness
under the "knowing and voluntary" standard. IS Kelly introduced
statistical evidence and testified to discriminatory statements
made by, American's employees.I? The panel held that either
type of evidence might establish willfulness under a "knowing
and voluntary" standard entitling the plaintiff to liquidated
damages. IS The panel recognized that the discrimination might
be inadvertent, however; hence it remanded for a redetermination by the district court, but without any guidance on how to
20. 640 F.2d at 980.
21. Id.
22. Id. n.7 (citing Wehr v. Burrough Corp., 619 F.2d 276, 280 (3d Cir. 1980)
(dictum)).
23. Id. at 980.
24.Id.
25. Id. n.9.
26. Id. at 981.
27.Id.
28.Id.
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distinguish between inadvertent and knowing violations.

Good faith defense
The court found further that the good faith defense of the
Fair Labor Standards Actle did not apply to ADEA actions because it was not specifically incorporated by reference in the section dealing with willfulness. 8o Under the FLSA there is no requisite of a showing of willfulness. 81 Because the willfulness
requirement was added to the ADEA, the court believed the
good faith defense was not necessary and held that the good
faith defense to liquidated damages was not applicable to ADEA
actions.

B.

FEDERAL STATUTORY JURISDICTION

1.

Usery v. Lacy

The Ninth Circuit issued two decisions this term evincing a
very expansive view of federal statutory jurisidiction. In Usery v.
Lacy (Aqua View),8. the court held ti)at all who employ construction workers8s are subject to regulation by the Occupational
Safety and Health Act (the Act)" as embracing the full range of
congressional power under the commerce clause. The opinion
raises the question whether any employer is exempt from regulation by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA).811
Defendant Lacy did not engage in a business directly affecting commerce. Lacy owned, operated and maintained a small
apartment building. He hired' approximately forty workers,
mostly students on a part-time basis, to construct a fifteen-unit
apartment addition. The Secretary of Labor was unable to show
that any materials Lacy used had been in interstate commerce. at
29. 29 U.S.C. § 260 (1976).
30. Jd. § 626(b).

31. 640 F.2d at 981.
32. 628 F.2d 1226 (9th Cir. 1980) (per Kennedy J.).
33. Jd. at 1228 n.l.
34. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976).
35. 29 U.S.C. § 652(5) (1976) defines as an employer any "person engaged in a business affecting commerce who has employees .... " Domestic activity is excluded. 29
C.F.R. § 1975.6 (1980).
36. Some of the lumber came from Weyerhaeuser, the defendant's saw was made by
Craftsman, and he drove a Ford station wagon. The Secretary failed to show that any of

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol12/iss1/11

64

Slizeski et al.: Labor Law

LABOR LAW

1982]

311

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) declined to take judicial
notice that Weyerhaeuser and Sears are engaged in interstate
commerce and that the possession of a single "Craftsman" drill
and a piece of plywood with the name "Weyerhaeuser" on it
meant defendant Lacy was "engaged in a business affecting commerce."S7 Accordingly, the ALJ dismissed the complaint. The
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (OSHRC)
affirmed.
Reversing the OSHRC, the Ninth Circuit distinguished two
types of statutory jurisdiction in the employment relations area.
When a statute concerns businesses" 'in commerce,' a fairly specific showing must be made,,;s8 but when a statute only requires
that a particular business "affects" commerce, statutory jurisdiction is much broader and exists "so long as the business is in a
class of activity that as a whole affects commerce."ss OSHA jurisdiction falls in the latter category.
The court reasoned that OSHA regulations cover all employers, with some specific inapplicable exceptions, and that the
opinion was consistent with OSHA regulations and congressional
intent to reach as broadly as possible because non-uniform coverage would give unsafe employers a competitive advantage.·o
Because the construction business normally affects commerce,
and construction of an apartment building is an activity of the
same type, the court concluded that hiring forty workers to construct a fifteen-unit apartment building was a business that affects commerce as a matter of law.
In a footnote, the panel took judicial notice of the position
unsuccessfully argued by OSHA's counsel before the ALJ:
Respondent Lacy testified that he used material
and tools manufactured by Weyerhaeuser and
Craftsman (Sears Roebuck). The use of material
that has at any point moved in commerce is
enough to establish that a business affects commerce, and it is appropriate to take judicial notice
these were manufactured out of state. See 628 F.2d at 1233.
37. [d. at 1234.
38. [d. at 1228.
39. [d.
40. [d. at 1229.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1982

65

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [1982], Art. 11

312

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12:305

of the fact that Lacy's ultimate suppliers, Weyerhaeuser and Sears, are engaged in the production
and distribution of goods for commerce. 4 )
Dissent

In a lengthy dissent, District Judge Kelleher objected to the
panel's broad reading of a statutory jurisdiction. Much of the
dissent is given over to a reiteration of the facts and testimony
before the ALJ, and the proper scope of appellate review. The
dissent relied heavily on two earlier opinions of this circuit-Hiatt v. Schlecht,'" and E.B. Weber v. Hiatt.'s Schlecht
held that where a plumbing contractor's business was totally intrastate, a showing that plumbing fixtures used by the contractor were manufactured out of state was insufficient to establish
jurisdiction over the business as one "affecting commerce.""
The dissent also relied on another Ninth Circuit opinion,
Godwin v. OSHRC.4& which involved safety citations for farm
machinery used to clear land upon which grapes were grown.
Wine was produced from the grapes and the wine entered interstate commerce. Godwin in turn relied on Wickard v. Filburn,··
the landmark constitutional law case in which the Supreme
Court applied the Agricultural Assistance Act of 1938 to wheat
grown purely for home consumption. The dissent argued that
because apartment buildings are neither raw materials nor goods
which move in interstate commerce, Lacy's construction of an
apartment did not lend itself to a Wickard analogy to the effect
that production for home use "can skew the interstate flow of
the product.""
The decision in Aqua View seems correct. The fact that
Lacy added fifteen units under his own supervision rather than
hire a building contractor does not change the nature of the
work and the seriousness of the hazards at the worksite. Furthermore, Wickard can be read to support the panel's opinion
41. [d. n.3.
42. 400 F.2d 875 (9th Cir. 1968).
43. 424 F.2d 1366 (9th Cir. 1970).
44. 400 F.2d at 877, cited in Usery v. Lacy, 628 F.2d at 1231 (Kelleher, D.J.,
dissenting).
45. 540 F.2d 1013 (9th Cir. 1973).
46. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
47. 628 F.2d at 1232.
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because non-uniform standards place employers who comply
with safety regulations at a competitive disadvantage and adversely affect the job market.
Aqua View has apparently overruled Schlecht and Weber,
although the precise reach of the opinion is unclear. The court
hinted that even one part-time construction worker would be
enough for the court to find statutory jurisdiction although it
refused to speculate as to the applicability of the Act to the case
of a handyman employed in the home. 48 The panel explained
that to the extent the employment looks less like a business in
the conventional sense and more like domestic activity, which is
specifically excluded from the act's coverage,·& the Secretary
might be obligated to prove the nexus with commerce. ao
2. NLRB v. Maxwell

In NLRB v. Maxwell,al the court further eroded the significance of Schlecht and held that Maxwell's purchase of goods,
materials and supplies in excess of $6,000 from out of state had
a sufficient effect on interstate commerce for the court to find
statutory jurisdiction. The panel relied on NLRB v. Inglewood
Park Cemetery Associational which held that $3,000 worth of
interstate purchases was not de minimis and was adequate to
support jurisdiction. The panel made no mention of Aqua View.
Per se rule

The court also adopted a per se rule regarding employer requests of employee statements given· in conjunction with unfair
labor practice investigations. The per se rule related to an unfair
labor practice. The Administrative Law Judge and the National
Labor Relations Board found that the employer (Maxwell) violated section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act by discharging one employee and requesting another employee to deliver a copy of the written statement submitted by the second
employee to the board during its investigation of the discharge.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

1d. at 1228 n.l.
29 C.F.R. § 1975.6 (1980) ..
628 F.2d at 1228 n.l.
637 F.2d 698 (9th Cir. 1981) (per Canby, J.).
355 F.2d 448 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 951 (1966).
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Maxwell is a sole proprietor, producing and selling ready
mixed concrete and employing five drivers. One driver was fired
in a dispute over a contract provision governing overtime pay.
The ALJ found the driver was fired for insisting on compliance
with terms of the collective bargaining agreement, and not, as
the employer alleged, because of acrimonious shouting
matches. 1I8
After the unfair labor practice charge was filed, Maxwell
asked Bower, another employee, for a copy of the statement
Bower gave to the Board. Maxwell gave no reassurance that no
reprisals would be taken and did not show that he needed the
statement for trial preparation. Bower complied with Maxwell's
request and furnished the copy. The ALJ found Bower could not
have refused the request and that Maxwell's actions violated
section 8(a)(1).The Board concurred.
The Ninth Circuit panel ruled that an employer request for
an employee's statement is a per se violation of section 8(a)(1)
when made (1) without reassurance that no reprisals will follow
from refusal, and (2) without a showing that the requested statement is needed for trial preparation, and that the employer is
seeking only what is necessary for that purpose. 1I4 The court
chose not to impose a balancing test, weighing coercion against
the employer's need for information.1I1I An analogous rule is employed in this circuit in the context of interrogation of employees with regard to union activities."
The panel reasoned that a lesser standard than the one
adopted would have a chilling, coercive effect on witness testimony-particularly in the case of current, rank and file and supervisory employees over whom the employer can exert intense,
if subtle, pressures concerning promotions, salary increases, job
assignments and hours. Employers are not likely to be seriously
53. 637 F.2d at 701.
54. Id. at 702.
55.Id.
56. Id. The permissibility of interrogation of employees about union activities depends on whether the circumstances as a whole indicate restraint or coercion of employees exercising § 7 rights. NLRB v. Silver Spur Casino, 623 F.2d 571, 584-85 (9th Cir.
1980); Penasquitos Village, Inc. v. NLRB, 565 F.2d 1074, 1080 (9th Cir. 1977); but see
NLRB v. Port Vancouver Plywood Co., 604 F.2d 596, 599 n.1 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 915 (1980).

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol12/iss1/11

68

Slizeski et al.: Labor Law

1982]

LABOR LAW

315

prejudiced by the new rule because it permits access to the
statements, to the extent they are necessary for the employer to
prepare a trial defense. Further, the Board itself permits access
to statements of employees who will be witnesses against the
employer. 57

57. 29 C.F.R. § 102.118(b) (1981).
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